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Overview and summary of results 
This study challenges the widely-held view that the persistence in inflation as measured by the 
Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) and observed in the euro area since 2001 may have been 
foremost a reflection of “structural rigidities” in labor and product markets. Accordingly, structural 
reforms that eliminate these rigidities are presented as necessary and sufficient conditions for boosting 
growth and purging inflation persistence, too. This view misses a peculiar fact about today’s variety of 
“stagflation” with series of hikes in indirect taxes and administered prices featuring prominently in it. 
Reflecting governments’ consolidation efforts in view of stagnation-induced budgetary pressures, the 
result is: “tax-push inflation”, i.e. a persistent and sizeable upward distortion in headline inflation. Since 
inflation “above two percent” has, in turn, forestalled more growth-supportive monetary policies, the 
euro area has become stuck in a vicious circle of protracted domestic demand stagnation and budgetary 
pressures that continue to nurture tax push. The alternative hypothesis put forward here thus stresses 
systematic macroeconomic policy failures as the cause of both stagnation and inflation persistence. For 
while it is true that headline inflation has proved surprisingly persistent in recent years, the same does 
not hold for measures of core inflation which better capture the true underlying demand situation and 
also provide a more accurate picture of the responsiveness of prices to market forces. It is found that 
tax-push inflation, a key symptom of macroeconomic mismanagement, may at times have contributed 
up to a third of overall headline inflation. Stripped of this factor and the impact of energy prices core 
inflation in the euro area has declined markedly in response to stagnation and today barely exceeds one 
percent. Effectively, then, the Maastricht regime of “stability-oriented” monetary policies protected by 
“sound public finance” safeguards has led to perverse results: both budget deficits and headline inflation 
turned out excessive. They turned out excessive not due to fiscal profligacy and deficit spending 
though, but protracted stagnation caused by systematic domestic demand mismanagement. 
Paradoxically, the supposed monetarist wisdom underlying this regime has not yielded stability but 
some unpleasant Keynesian arithmetic instead, whereby tighter money now has led to higher inflation 
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  1today. The regime urgently requires a fundamental overhaul – with the primary objective of refocusing 
macroeconomic policies on stabilization and GDP growth. Appropriate structural reforms can only 
complement more successful macroeconomic management, but cannot substitute for it. In fact, 
continued one-sided focus on structural reform without macroeconomic policy reform will further 
magnify already existing risks of sliding into a deflationary spiral.  
 
 
1. The issue: Inflation persistence   
Despite protracted stagnation in Germany and much of the euro area since 2001 inflation 
as measured by the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) has proved 
conspicuously persistent, as many commentators observed. They point out that while 
mainstream economic theory would predict declining inflationary pressures in a 
stagnating economy, inflation in the euro area has barely fallen at all, stubbornly staying 
“above two percent” in all these years. From early on this stickiness in inflation 
developments was widely considered as yet another piece of evidence of the euro area’s 
allegedly all-pervasive “structural rigidities” (OECD 2002, Economic Outlook 72). Labor 
market rigidities and misguided wage policies in particular are seen as the root cause of 
all troubles, hindering “stability-oriented” monetary policies and preventing the timely 
control of inflation. While the ECB’s (2004) “Inflation Persistence Network” (IPN), 
especially initiated to investigate the phenomenon, has focused on microeconomic 
pricing policies in product markets, rigidities in labor markets as the supposed ultimate 
culprit never seem to be too far from the mind of the ECB’s Chief Economist Otmar 
Issing, in particular.
1  
  No doubt the inflation persistence issue is of utmost importance to the ECB. For 
not only has HICP inflation proved surprisingly sticky, the ECB has also persistently 
failed on its “primary” (or, according to the late Wim Duisenberg even, “sole”) objective 
                                                 
1 For instance, in his Dinner Speech at the conference on “Inflation persistence in the euro area” on 10 
December 2004, Issing comments that “The IPN reports that prices in the services sector across all 
countries are generally stickier than in other sectors, [adding] be it due to rigid wage developments or to the 
specific market structure with generally less severe competitiveness pressure”; with the wage-setting side 
not being studied by the IPN at all. Issing there also asserts that “flexibility at the micro-level ... facilitates 
the conduct of monetary policy” and that “a smoother conduct of monetary policy may be facilitated by 
further implementation of structural reforms that may tend to reduce the degree of persistence in inflation.”  
  2of maintaining price stability, which the bank itself defined as inflation “below (but close 
to) two percent” for by now six years in a row. This ongoing monetary policy failure 
represents another big surprise and has led some observers to conclude that the ECB 
might take too lax an attitude towards its price stability goal and pay too much attention 
to output stabilization (CEPR 2004). There certainly is a widespread concern that the 
persistent over-shooting of the inflation ceiling presents a credibility problem to the ECB 
(IMF 2005). And, more generally, observers tend to interpret the persistence in inflation 
as an excuse for the ECB for refusing to take decisive action to bolster domestic demand. 
For instance, the OECD (2005) in its latest survey of the euro area again observed that: 
“in the recent downturn inflation has failed to come down decisively, and this has limited 
the scope for monetary policy to support economic activity in the short run”.    
  The trouble with the popular “inflation persistence theme” and its supposed labor 
market roots is that there really is no basis for the view that wage inflation may be to 
blame for the failure of HICP inflation to decline any faster.
2 Since the mid1990s wage 
trends in the euro area have been remarkably stable. Moreover, if anything, wage 
inflation has not been too high, but perhaps excessively low; with household 
consumption representing “a key missing link .. for a more vigorous, self-sustaining 
recovery” (IMF 2005, p. 8).
3 Meanwhile, wage inflation has shrunk to extraordinarily low 
levels by any historical or international standard. The ECB (like the Bundesbank before it 
ever since 1996) is notorious for referring to “historically low”
4 interest rates, which euro 
                                                 
2 This might explain why more recently at least the IMF (2005) has started to back off from this position, 
acknowledging that “wage moderation” has not paid off as expected and putting more emphasis on product 
market rigidities as the new culprit. The one-sided emphasis on structural rigidities is also at odds with the 
empirical finding that inflation in the euro area is, if at all, only moderately more persistent than in the US, 
presumably the flexible economy par excellence (IMF 2003).  
3 There is no convincing evidence that “Angstsparen” might be behind this missing link, an idea that has 
been much heard of in public debates in Germany in recent years. Private households’ saving rate is well 
below the level of the early 1990s, and it bounced back only mildly since 2000; which most likely reflects a 
substantial redistribution of incomes towards the well-off. Rather than reflecting a diminished disposition 
toward spending, stagnant or shrinking consumption in Germany (even more so than elsewhere in the euro 
area) has reflected stagnant or shrinking real disposable incomes. On the euro area, the IMF rightly 
observes that “reticent consumption growth has moved in line with small gains in disposable income, 
limited by modest wage earnings and unfavorable price shocks. On the domestic front, these have included 
unusually large administered price hikes, which cut some 0.7 and 0.4 percentage point off real disposable 
incomes in 2004 and 2005, respectively. In tandem with increasingly uncertain benefit prospects, 
consumers have been disinclined to reduce saving rates, unlike in previous recoveries” (IMF 2005, p. 8-9).    
4 In fact, recently Mr Trichet has described the rate as “historically extremely low” (Bloomberg, 21 
September 2005).  
  3area central bankers keenly interpret as indicating the good quality and non-growth-
restraining character of their policies. If indicators of good quality are that easy to be had, 
do not miss that wage increases in the euro area have slumped to a historical low of 
around two percent, while wage increases in Germany are even in the vicinity of zero.  
The point is however that while memories of 1970s-style “stagflation” may still 
be haunting some important European policymakers, it is not clear that more than mere 
fantasies are involved here. Today, wage pressures are notable for their absence; if 
anything, they point in the downward direction. The conventional inflation persistence 
theme stressing labor market rigidities is based on a very flimsy empirical basis. 
  Therefore, the analysis in this paper sets out to fundamentally challenge the 
conventional wisdom on inflation persistence in the euro area, offering an alternative 
hypothesis for the peculiar type of “stagflation” observed in recent years that stresses 
systematic macroeconomic policy failures as the cause of both stagnation and inflation 
persistence. In short, inflation persistence arose not despite, but because of stagnation; 
given the euro area’s peculiar macroeconomic policy regime. The alternative hypothesis 
put forward here implies that a more coordinated and more growth-oriented 
macroeconomic policy mix would have forestalled one of the key drivers behind price 
trends in recent years: a series of hikes in indirect taxes and government administered 
prices owing to consolidation efforts undertaken in view of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
While the analysis thus unearths a fundamental regime flaw, the more immediate concern 
is that deflation risks are looming high in Germany and the euro area at large. Popular 
excitement about the persistence in headline inflation seems to have nourished oversight 
of the crucial fact that underlying market inflation is in the high-danger zone. 
  The analysis proceeds as follows. The next section provides a general overview 
on how governmental measures can affect prices, which serves to narrow down the first 
part of the hypothesis of this paper, namely that SGP-imposed budgetary pressures due to 
protracted stagnation have led to a sizeable upward distortion in headline inflation since 
2001. Section 3 then turns to the measurement issue, focusing on the “ECB proxy 
measure” of the phenomenon at hand for the euro area as a whole, while sections 4 and 5 
  4explore more closely the situation in Germany and other euro area countries, respectively, 
taking national measures and studies into account as well.  
A discussion of the relevance and implications of the matter in the light of 
monetary theory follows in section 6, focusing on the coordination and interaction 
between fiscal and monetary policies and the distinction between “core” and “headline” 
inflation measures. Section 7 then provides an account of the ECB’s prominent role in the 
genesis of inflation persistence, emphasizing the bank’s part in first provoking the slump 
and then failing to overcome it by an equally decisive use of its interest rate weapon. 
Contrary to the idea that inflation in excess of “two percent” might have excused the 
ECB from boosting domestic demand, the bank’s notorious reneging on this part of its 
mandate turns out to have dealt a blow to its primary price stability objective too. As a 
consequence, Germany and the euro area are today at danger of drifting into deflation, as 
section 8 argues. This is especially the case, if structural reforms further undermined 
downward wage rigidities while at the same time weakening demand and confidence.  
This highlights systematic macroeconomic policy failures as the ultimate cause of 
inflation persistence in a stagnating economy suffering from stagnation-induced 
budgetary pressures – the second part of the alternative hypothesis put forward here. 
Further support for this hypothesis is provided by means of simulation exercises 
undertaken in section 9 that illustrate how systematic macroeconomic policy failures can 
cause “tax-push inflation”. Section 10 concludes the analysis and offers some policy 
recommendations. 
  
2. Governmental measures that affect prices: administered prices, indirect taxes, 
and the concept of tax-push inflation  
Governments affect prices in multifarious ways. Most directly this is the case when 
governments determine the pricing policies of enterprises they own themselves. 
Traditionally, state-owned enterprises have featured mainly public utilities in network 
industries like telecommunications, postal services, television and radio stations, 
electricity and natural gas, and public transportation. Public-funded education systems 
and research and development institutes are another case in point. Furthermore, often 
  5local governments act as the sole providers of certain mainly housing-related services like 
water supply, refuse collection, and sewerage collection for which they directly set the 
charges or tariffs. Direct price-setting is also involved when public offices charge fees for 
services such as issuing passports, driving licenses or other certificates.  
  In many cases, though, government influence on prices may be more indirect in 
nature. In particular, governments may control or restrict the pricing policies in certain 
industries or services through laws and regulations. These may for instance require 
certain privately-owned firms to get government-approval for any price changes. 
Traditionally, such regulations have typically applied to many of the above industries, if 
not state-owned, as well as the following: rents, health services and health insurance, as 
well as insurance more generally. Of course, even regulations that do not directly concern 
prices can still have indirect price effects, namely through affecting the cost of 
production. Environmental or safety regulations are a case in point here.  
  Indirect taxes (and subsidies) provide another important channel through which 
governments may decisively influence price developments, both directly in case of 
consumption taxes as well as indirectly when levied on producers at intermediate stages 
of production. Consumption taxes may include specific indirect taxes on particular 
products as well as value-added taxes on goods and services in general (although not all 
items may be subject to a uniform tax rate and some may even be tax-exempt).  
The former category typically features excise duties on alcohol and tobacco as 
well as energy products. The point here is that the tax-component in prices may be 
especially large, even exceeding 50 percent, so that government policy may easily 
represent the predominant price-determining factor. On the other hand, market forces 
may still play a crucial role too though, especially in the case of energy products. As to 
the latter, even though VAT rates rarely exceed 20 percent and are often far lower than 
that, changes in VAT rates are even more prone to impact conclusively on price 
developments since they apply to a large share of the overall consumption basket.   
And this highlights that it is really changes in tax rates as well as changes in fees, 
tariffs, or otherwise (government) “administered” prices that are of key interest here. At 
any time, the structure and general level of prices will be partly shaped by government 
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general purchasing power of consumers’ disposable incomes and value of wealth) in 
either direction. A state-owned monopolist may charge below market-price to subsidize 
the consumption of the particular good or service at hand. Or, it may mark up lusciously 
so as to maximize government revenue. The key issue here is the role of changes in 
government policy, particularly hikes in indirect taxes and administered prices with a 
view of raising revenues, in determining price developments.  
An important complication arises here since increases in indirect taxes and 
administered prices may in principle be due to various motivations. For instance, taxes on 
alcohol and tobacco products may be raised to curb consumption for health reasons, just 
as taxes on energy products may be raised to curb consumption for environmental 
reasons. Or it may be government policy to implement a deliberate shift away from direct 
taxation (or social security contributions or other charges that add to non-wage labor 
costs) toward indirect taxation. In fact, more than one reason may be at play at any time 
and in any particular case.  
The hypothesis investigated in what follows is that the revenue-raising motive has 
been key to the conspicuous upward distortion in headline inflation observed in recent 
years reflecting numerous hikes in indirect taxes and administered prices. Such measures, 
moreover, have owed to SGP-imposed budgetary pressures affecting more and more euro 
area governments as a first-rate macroeconomic policy failure maneuvered the euro area 
into protracted stagnation. While it is widely held that market liberalization had marked 
disinflationary effects during the 1990s, governmental measures seem to have turned 
“inflationary” since the start of this decade. They have not been inflationary in the 
conventional sense of a government spending boom firing the printing press though. 
Quite the opposite – the driving mechanism has been a budgetary crunch.  
To be sure, when viewed individually, one-off increases in indirect taxes and 
administered prices involve price level effects only, at least as far as their direct impact is 
concerned. And a related fear is that they may induce compensatory wage increases, in 
particular, and through such “second-round effects” turn into inflation proper. So let me 
emphasize that this is not what is meant here when referring to the phenomenon of “tax-
  7push inflation”. Rather, the term describes the possibility that a whole series of hikes in 
indirect taxes and administered can give rise to a persistent upward distortion in 
measured inflation over an extended period of many years; particularly if the budgetary 
pressures that nourish it – according to our hypothesis – do not go away.  
  Accordingly, the term “tax-push measures” is used to refer to any particular 
individual measure that may be primarily driven by budgetary pressures when the hikes 
in indirect taxes or administered prices involved push up the price level, while the term 
“tax-push inflation” is reserved to describe the inflationary phenomenon that a whole 
series of such measures can give rise to over an extended period of many years.  
  The above discussion makes it clear that it will not be easy to either measure 
precisely the magnitude of tax-push inflation at any time or to substantiate conclusively 
budgetary pressures resulting from a macroeconomic policy failure as its cause. Not only 
can motives other than budgetary pressures be at work too. The whole variety of 
government influences on prices can undergo fundamental changes over time as well. For 
instance, industries may be privatized or (re-) nationalized, regulations be changed or 
repealed (markets be “liberalized”, as it were). Certain taxes, fees or charges be 
abolished, or new ones introduced. Public services that were tax-financed previously may 
become subject to new specific fees, like university tuition fees or road toll 
(Straßenmaut). Health insurance coverage may be reduced instead of raising premiums 
(either of regulated private providers or of the public sector health funds), with such 
quality-reducing measures being similarly hard to measure precisely as quality-enhancing 
ones. There is thus no denying that multifarious factors complicate the task of arriving of 
what may be properly regarded as “market-determined” inflation – as opposed to 
government-determined (or “tax-push”) inflation. Yet, it is of great interest to 
policymakers, trying to come to grips with the true underlying market situation, to have 
as clear as possible an idea of what inflation would be absent tax-push at any time.  
  Another caveat must be added here. For what has just been referred to as market-
determined inflation may not be wholly independent of tax-push inflation. For instance, 
market forces behind general wage trends in the economy are likely to affect public 
sector wage-setting too. Similarly, energy price increases driven by market forces 
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fares, for instance. At the same time, it is well possible that tax-push inflation may not 
only distort consumer prices upwards, but thereby also help to keep wage inflation up; 
those much-feared – supposedly negative – second-round effects.  
In a way, however, such interdependencies between market forces and the tax-
push issue also help to further pinpoint the hypothesis. For there exists a sizeable amount 
of research on the role of regulated or government administered prices in explaining price 
“stickiness” and “inflation persistence”. Research on the U.S. situation appears to 
confirm that the lagged adjustment of regulated prices is part of the overall stickiness of 
prices and persistence in inflation trends (Dexter et al. 2004). In an upswing this factor 
tends to dampen any acceleration in inflation driven by market forces. The opposite 
seems to hold in a downswing. Researchers in the ECB’s inflation persistence taskforce 
have identified this factor as playing a role in the euro area as well (Lünnemann and 
Mathä 2005). Yet, their perspective is one of simply treating the government’s 
contribution to the supposed inflation persistence as reflecting notorious rigidities – 
which one just needs to get rid of to solve the whole problem.  
This view may be far off the mark though. Not any obscure rigidities may be at 
work here, but budgetary pressures. More precisely, what we are observing may be a 
symptom of the counterproductive interaction of macroeconomic policies within the 
Maastricht regime. The budgetary embarrassment this involved set in motion the very 
mechanism that is causing tax-push inflation.  
It is thus of some interest that the ECB itself has not failed to notice that indirect 
taxes and administered prices have given rise to upward pressures on the HICP measure 
of inflation, which the bank aims to keep “below two percent”. The ECB even set out to 
design a measure of this phenomenon – which may be a good starting point here.  
 
3. The ECB’s proxy measures of the two key constituents of tax-push inflation 
No reliable estimate of the effects of changes in administered prices and indirect taxes on 
HICP currently exists for the euro area, as only a few member countries regularly 
  9compile such estimates. In view of this deficiency the ECB designed a “proxy measure” 
that is meant to provide at least a rough estimate of the direct impact of governmental 
measures on prices by quantifying their contributions to annual HICP inflation.
5  
As far as administered services prices are concerned, the following sub-
components (based on the lowest level of HICP aggregation available) were included in 
the ECB’s “very rough and partial measure” (ECB 2003, p. 35; with 2003 HICP weights 
shown in brackets): refuse collection (0.5%), sewerage collection (0.5%), medical and 
paramedical services (0.9%, dental services (0.6%), hospital services (0.7%), passenger 
transport by railway (0.4%), postal services (0.2%), education (0.9%) and social 
protection (0.9%). In 2003, their aggregate HICP weight was 5.6%, accounting for 13.6% 
of the services component. By 2005, these values have increased slightly to 5.8% and 
14.3%, respectively.   
  As will be seen further below, compared to some existing national measures, the 
ECB’s “synthetic administered price index” has a very low weight. This owes to the fact 
that significant differences exist as to governmental measures’ influence on prices across 
the euro area. So the ECB’s proxy measure is a kind of “smallest common denominator”. 
Moreover, at the euro area level a kind of diversification effect arises due to the fact that 
governmental measures will usually differ in timing and degree, and perhaps even 
direction, across euro area countries. As far as its informative value for the common 
monetary policy is concerned, the ECB’s proxy measure should pick up the broader 
trends in the areas of health care and social protection, education and public services, as 
well as non-rent housing costs. But to get a better idea of what is actually happening to 
administered prices and how that relates to the budgetary situation and SGP-induced 
budgetary pressures, a closer look at the country level will be necessary.  
  Regarding the price impact of changes in indirect taxation, the ECB’s proxy 
measure seems even more problematic. Ideally, one would like to have a comprehensive 
                                                 
5 The HICP, which has 12 groups of goods and services according to consumption, is required at the four-
digit COICOP (Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose) level. The ECB (2004, December 
MB, p. 8) observed that a more detailed breakdown at euro are level “could also facilitate the derivation of 
additional measures required for economic analysis, in particular the isolation of the effect of changes in 
indirect taxes on the HICP (“HICP Constant Tax”) and administered prices”. Eurostat is currently piloting a 
HICP Constant Tax project that should yield first results in 2006.  
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subsidies). When the ECB first discussed this factor in the March Bulletin of 2003, it 
used a synthetic measure that aggregates country information on value added tax (VAT) 
as well as energy and tobacco excise duties. While no further hints on the precise 
calculation of the synthetic measure were provided, the stated underlying assumption was 
that half of the energy and tobacco price components were tax-related. 
The difficulty here is that while energy and tobacco are clearly subject to heavy 
taxation, especially energy prices tend to be subject to volatile market forces too; with oil 
prices as the key factor behind energy price trends. Hence including the whole product 
price may greatly distort any measure of supposedly government influences on prices 
unless world prices remain stable over the relevant period. Clearly, this problem would 
merely be mitigated if only some proportion – reflecting the tax component in price – 
were included in the measure. To properly quantify the price effects of changes in 
indirect taxes more sophisticated methods of separating government and market 
influences are needed. They are not available at the euro area level.  
Further difficulties arise as far as VAT is concerned. To begin with, typically not 
all products and services are subject to a uniform tax rate, while VAT rates moreover 
vary a lot across the euro area. The corresponding aggregation issues may be solved 
however as long as the expenditure components subject to VAT can all be separated. 
Another issue concerns the extent to which changes in indirect taxes are actually passed 
on in price. The conventional assumption in quantifying the theoretical price impact of 
changes in indirect taxes is one of full pass-through to consumers. A price index net of 
such tax measures would thus deduct the postulated full pass-through effect. Given that 
the aim is to separate market forces and government influence, this convention seems 
appropriate. For even if retailers are not in a position to pass on increases in indirect 
taxes, a gap that is correctly quantified in this way nevertheless arises between what 
consumers pay and what retailers get due to the tax measure(s) at hand. And this gap 
properly captures by how much headline inflation misses to properly reflect the 
underlying market situation – which should be the key concern to monetary policy.  
  11  When the ECB returned to the issue in the January Bulletin of 2004 it noted that 
in 2002 and 2003 average VAT rates had remained broadly stable, energy taxes only 
risen slightly, while tobacco prices had “increased significantly driven primarily by the 
higher taxation on tobacco products” (ECB 2004, p. 27). In fact, while world tobacco 
prices (in US dollars) have been fairly stable or even falling, several euro area countries 
have resorted to sizeable tobacco tax increases, which had the effect that tobacco price 
increases have contributed significantly to HICP inflation in recent years.  
Given this background, and for lack of any better euro-area-wide data on the 
indirect-tax situation in particular, the ECB’s own analysis of the issue suggests that for 
the analysis of recent years a rough and ready measure of tax-push inflation may be 
constructed by adding up the two components: (1) administered prices within the service 
component of HICP and (2) tobacco prices. It must be stressed that the former represents 
no more than a crude and narrow proxy of government administered prices (GAP 
inflation) while the latter is an even cruder proxy of changes in indirect taxes and 
subsidies (IT inflation). The results for the period since 1999 are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Mind the gap









1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Sources. ECB, Eurostat (August 2005) 
Note. The ECB proxy measure estimates the direct price effects of tax increases on tobacco products and of a narrow range of administered prices 





























Figure 1 indicates that a marked acceleration in tax-push inflation has occurred 
since 2001. While an extension of coverage (concerning health, social protection and 
education services) may have contributed to tax-push inflation until early 2001, 
  12subsequent rises were no statistical artifacts at all. If anything, given the low coverage 
overall, one might suspect that a broader and more precise measure of tax-push inflation 
would underline the quantitative relevance of this contributing factor to HICP inflation. 
On a rise since 2001, tax-push inflation according to this proxy measure seems to have 
contributed roughly 0.5 percentage points to HICP inflation in 2004 overall. At its peak 
in December 2004, it contributed no less than 0.7 percentage points, with HICP inflation 
running at 2.4 percent at that time.  
Since January 2005, tax-push inflation, at least for the time being, has fallen back 
to between 0.3-0.5 percentage points; continuing to keep headline inflation stubbornly 
above 2 percent. But with budgetary pressures and SGP-imposed consolidation attempts 
looming across the euro area with ever fewer exceptions among member countries, our 
hypothesis suggests that tax-push inflation might continue to play a prominent role in 
years to come, too.  
This result raises a number of interesting questions. One question is whether tax-
push inflation has been uniformly spread across the euro area, or whether some member 
countries might have contributed significantly more than others to the aggregate outcome 
(apart from country-size effects in HICP). This approach might yield some evidence on 
the key issue whether countries that have struggled more with the SGP constraint and 
budgetary slippage in the course of protracted stagnation have also contributed relatively 
more to this upward distortion in headline inflation. While budgetary pressures due to a 
fiscal squeeze are not the only candidate cause of tax-push inflation, a look at the country 
level might thus help to identify and substantiate budgetary pressures as the prime mover 
behind the phenomenon.  
Note that a look at the country level might also be useful to evaluate the extent to 
which the above proxy measure captures the true situation in any particular country. For 
this purpose the “ECB proxy measure” may be calculated for individual countries and 
then compared with alternative national measures that are available for those countries. 
Among other things, this exercise might also help to discern “best practice” in this field 
and perhaps yield fruitful advice both for individual countries as well as euro area 
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other euro area countries.  
Finally, there is the issue of how the monetary authorities should treat the 
phenomenon at hand. One extreme answer is that it does not matter at all which particular 
prices might be the chief contributors to any rise in the price index since relative price 
changes are of no concern to monetary policy, so that the monetary authorities should 
always fight inflation no matter what. Seen from this perspective, then, our study can 
only have some limited informative value, at best.  
Another response might however be that the monetary authorities should be 
careful in judging the truly market-determined underlying inflation trends at work and not 
respond to factors that cannot be controlled by use of the usual monetary armoury; or at 
least not without causing unnecessary damage in areas of the economy other than the one 
behind the tax-push phenomenon. In this case, only second-round effects should be of 
any concern at all and direct price effects treated as noise. A complication arises however 
if noise of the tax-push kind systematically distorts inflation in one direction: upward, as 
in recent years. Rather than ignoring such a systematic distortion, it then seems vital to 
properly investigate its underlying causes.  
The matter coming to the forefront here concerns the interaction and coordination 
between monetary and fiscal polices. As we shall see in sections 6 to 8 below, the tax-
push phenomenon gets to the very heart of the macroeconomic policy regime design that 
characterizes the euro area today. 
 
4. Measuring tax-push inflation in Germany 
Figure 2 shows a sizeable contribution of tax-push inflation based on the ECB proxy 
measure and suggests that Germany may have played a prominent role in the 
phenomenon since 2001. National measures are available to further investigate the 
matter.  
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Source. ECB, Eurostat (August 2005) Note. The ECB proxy measure only captures the role of tobacco products 






























The German Council of Economic Experts (GCEE) first addressed the issue of 
administered prices in its annual report of 1976/7. Since then it has regularly updated the 
concept which today provides a rather comprehensive measure of government influence 
on prices; in fact, perhaps too comprehensive in some respects.  
The measure distinguishes four groups of goods and services, with different 
degrees of government influence on prices. Group 1 includes “directly administered” 
goods and services prices, that is, prices directly set by government bodies. Examples 
include radio and TV as well as other license fees. They also include important services 
related to housing, like sewerage and refuse collection fees. This group currently has an 
overall weight of 7.6%. Group 2 includes “partly administered” prices, referring to cases 
where government bodies have significant regulatory rights in setting prices. Examples 
include electricity, postal services, telephone services, as well as a variety of health care 
services. This group has an overall weight of 11.1%. Group 3 of “quasi-administered” 
prices includes goods and services that are subject to specific indirect taxes, like alcohol 
and tobacco as well as gasoline and heating oil. This group has an overall weight of 
9.5%. Finally, group 4 of “indirectly administered” prices includes agricultural products 
that are subject to agricultural regulations (the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, in 
particular). This group, which is divided into two sub-groups and only includes 
  15unprocessed products, has an overall weight of 3.6%. This approach yields an overall 
weight of administered prices of nearly one third of the overall consumer price index. 
The GCEE measure’s key advantage is that it is fairly comprehensive thanks to 
the high level of product disaggregation available in Germany’s price statistics. The 
calculation of groups 1 and 2 with a combined weight of 19% in the national CPI is 
exemplary, providing a reasonable and comprehensive measure of GAP inflation. Some 
important problems and limitations relate to groups 3 and 4 though.  
The trouble with group 3 is that it includes the total prices of the relevant goods 
and therefore fails to capture the precise price effects that are really attributable to 
changes in the specific indirect taxes these goods are subject to. This can be very 
problematic in case of volatile (net) prices. Given the high volatility of oil prices since the 
late 1990s, the overwhelming impact of this factor in view of the high index weight of 
energy can greatly distort the measure. It may thus be advisable to leave group 3 aside. 
Admittedly, an important downside to completely excluding this (partial) measure of IT 
inflation is that tobacco products are thereby also excluded, and hence the effects of 
increases in the relevant taxes too, which have played such a prominent role in recent 
years. As a compromise (in line with the ECB proxy measure) it might therefore make 
sense to include at least tobacco prices (as one key item of group 3. The case for not 
taking group 4 into account is even stronger. The price impact of regulations in this area 
has not only declined over time, which the GCEE has taken this into account by reducing 
the coverage and weight of this group from originally around 10%. Given the dominant 
role of CAP this group is unlikely to reflect national budgetary pressures well.  
Finally, another grave shortcoming of the GCEE’s measure is that VAT changes 
are not captured at all. This is not any serious problem only as long as average VAT rates 
remain constant. German VAT rates were last changed on January 1, 1993, and again on 
April 1, 1998. With the possibility of a two-percentage point increase in VAT perhaps as 
early as in January 2006, this source of tax-push inflation may however become very 
alive again in the near future. It is practice in Germany that the Federal Statistical Office 
Destatis publishes an estimate of the theoretical price impact of the measure (assuming 
full path-through). In a press release of 12 July 2005, the Destatis announced that the 
  16prospective measure would raise measured inflation by 0.9 percentage points. The impact 
on the HICP for the euro area would thus be approximately 0.3 percentage points.  
 
Figure 3. Comparing measures of administered price inflation in Germany
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  A comparison between the ECB’s synthetic index of administered prices applied 
to Germany and the GCEE’s “narrow index” (including groups 1 and 2 only, which 
actually provide a broad index of GAP) for the period since 1999 shows a number of 
things (see figure 3).
6 To begin with, the GCEE’s measure, being significantly more 
comprehensive as regards administered prices, indicates that, if anything, the ECB’s 
proxy measure underestimates the magnitude of tax-push inflation in Germany since 
2001. In particular, the GCEE’s narrow measure shows an upward distortion of up to one 
percentage point in 2004.   
Furthermore, the GCEE’s measure highlights that tax push significantly distorted 
headline inflation upwards in 1997-1998, when Germany undertook some last-minute 
efforts to bring its deficit ratio below three percent, but then actually slowed the 
acceleration in inflation in 1999-2000, when GDP grew relatively strongly and budgetary 
pressures, for a while, seemed a problem of the past. Figure 4, which compares the 
                                                 
6 As expected, due to sharp energy price movements excluding group 3 from headline inflation as well 
greatly distorts the picture. By contrast, the fact that we need to rely here on the national CPI whereas the 
ECB proxy measure refers to HICP is of little significance as the two indices of consumer prices show only 
mild deviations in Germany’s case. 
  17contributions of administered prices to headline inflation according to the GCEE’s 
narrow index and the ECB’s “synthetic administered price index” only, reveals that 
another sharp reversal in tax push then occurred in 2001, as Germany’s economy tanked 
and perpetual conflicts with the SGP’s ceiling started.  
 
Figure 4. Assessing the contributions of government administered prices in Germany 
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The case of Germany is of even greater interest though, as a closer look at another 
episode in its recent history shows. Conditions of budgetary stress had also occurred in 
the early 1990s following German unification. By mid 1991, a major attempt at fiscal 
consolidation started that intensified in subsequent years. To investigate the role of tax-
push inflation during this earlier episode, it is informative to compare the GCEE’s 
measure with an alternative index developed by Weeber (1994, 1997, 1998).  
Apart from excluding agricultural products, which we have put aside by focusing on the 
GCEE’s narrow index, Weeber’s measure differs in a number of important ways from the 
GCEE’s measure. On the one hand, rather than including the full price of products that 
come under the GCEE’s group 3, such as tobacco, gasoline and heating oil, only the tax 
share in their prices enters into Weeber’s calculations. This reduces the overall weight of 
group 3 products to 5.5% (roughly 60% of their weight within the GCEE’s broader 
index). On the other hand, Weeber’s index includes the VAT share on all remaining 
products, whereas VAT is completely ignored in the GCEE’s measure. One would thus 
  18expect that especially around times of VAT changes or changes in other indirect taxes 
that are not captured in the GCEE’s narrow index, Weeber’s index should yield a more 
precise picture of the actual situation. 
 
Figure 5. Rivisiting the 1990s 
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Figure 5 shows the results of this comparison. Both measures indicate that tax push was 
calm around 1995-1996. Both before and after the two measures deviated markedly at 
times. As expected, they deviated the most around the times when VAT increases 
occurred (January 1, 1993, and April 1, 1998). Other measures that explain the deviation 
in the early 1990s include energy tax increases on July 1, 1991 and again on January 1, 
1994, which are not captured by the GCEE’s narrow index.
7  
The overall picture that appears from this investigation is that tax-push inflation has 
played an important if not decisive role in Germany at three highly critical junctures in 
recent history. First, it is worthwhile to recall that the Bundesbank’s extraordinarily 
aggressive monetary tightening (short-term nominal interest rates reached 10 percent) 
that occurred in response to unification, more precisely after mid 1991, was motivated by 
                                                 
7 The GCEE’s revised index (2000=100) of today shows a significantly larger tax-push contribution than its 
contemporary version. This may be partly due to its all-German nature. But it may also reflect the fact that 
since the annual report of 2000/01 the GCEE’s index captures non-rent housing costs, which played an 
important role in the early 1990s. Weeber’s index included a proxy measure for non-rent housing costs. 
While underestimating the actual impact of this factor, this difference in coverage is another factor behind 
the deviations in the early 1990s when compared to the GCEE’s old index (1991=100).   
  19rising inflation.
8 Yet, while headline consumer price inflation peaked at just below 4 
percent in Western German in 1992, the underlying market-determined rate of inflation 
was merely running at around 3 percent, barely higher than during the 1980s (except for 
the oil price slump in 1986) and remarkably tame; a tameness at the price front which a 
look at producer price inflation (stable around 2 percent) confirms too.  
The second occasion around the time of the “Maastricht test” in the spring of 1998 was 
characterized by a public debate about the Bundesbank’s role in fostering employment 
and reducing Germany’s high unemployment (which peaked in the winter of 1997 after 
roughly 2 million job persons out of work in Western Germany). The official Bundesbank 
position at the time was that all unemployment was structural and that the Bundesbank 
had done its job by focusing on price stability (see Hesse and Naujokat 1998, for 
instance). In fact, after cutting interest rates in an extraordinarily sluggish way between 
September 1992 and 1995, the Bundesbank then even hiked interest rates again in 
October 1997 – despite stagnant domestic demand. This is of interest as the phenomenon 
of protracted domestic demand stagnation has plagued Germany ever since. 
Seen in this light, recent developments are really the third occasion within 15 years that 
has stability-oriented monetary authorities facing highly distorted headline inflation 
numbers when trying to come to grips with the true underlying situation (cf. Bibow 1998, 
2003, 2005a). To comprehend how very low current market-determined underlying 
inflation trends in Germany really are, it may be appropriate to use a core consumer price 
inflation measure that in addition to the OECD’s practice of excluding alcohol, tobacco, 
food and energy prices, also excludes the GCEE’s “narrow index” (groups 1 and 2).  
                                                 
8 A further reason was monetary growth in excess of the Bundesbank’s target – another curious repeat of 
which, albeit for different reasons, also contributed to lead the ECB astray in recent years.  
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Figure 6 shows a market-determined core inflation of near-zero, which is in line with 
wage inflation in Germany. The question of relevance of our findings for monetary policy 
will be further discussed in section 6 below. Here we conclude that Germany features 
prominently among euro area countries with significant tax-push inflation. As stagnation 
brought Germany into notorious conflict with the SGP, tax-push inflation soared (see 
Figure 7). 
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Notes. The synthetic measure of tax-push inflation includes the GCEE's narrow index (groups 1 and 2) as well as tobacco prices (2005: Jan-
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  215. Measuring tax-push inflation in other euro area countries  
Austria.  
Since entering the EU in 1995 Austria has experienced one of the lowest inflation rates, 
averaging just 1.5 percent per year. Since the start of EMU Austria has been second only 
to Germany among euro area countries, which has benefited Austria’s competitiveness: 
except for 2003, net exports have added significantly to GDP growth (OECD 2003).
9 
Since the late 1990s Austria’s current account balance has swung from a deficit of around 
two to three percent of GDP to a small surplus. Domestic demand was strong in the years 
1998-2000, but plunged in 2001.  
In this context, it is of some interest that Austria pursued an anti-cyclical consolidation 
strategy in the 1990s. Fiscal stance was expansionary in 1992-95, consolidation with a 
view of meeting the Maastricht budget deficit criterion only took place in 1996-97 
(Bibow 2004c). A new government then changed course in 2000, enacting a sharp fiscal 
retrenchment that improved the “structural balance by 2
3/4 per cent, marking the largest 
improvement within the OECD” (OECD 2003, p. 43). While Austria attained a small 
budget surplus in 2001, domestic demand plunged. Increases in indirect taxes featured 
prominently in the consolidation effort: “mainly, the package consist[ed] of increases in 
indirect taxes – the tobacco tax, vehicle insurance tax, levy on electricity”, as the OECD 
(2001, p. 43) noted. A small budget deficit has re-emerged since, but Austria is still 
among those few EU countries that are not facing severe SGP-imposed budgetary 
pressures yet. Interestingly, Austria’s role in the tax-push phenomenon in the euro area 
has been unusual, too. 
                                                 
9 Austria even gained in competitiveness relative to Germany since 1995 (Fluch and Rumler 2005). In 
addition, the country is the foremost beneficiary of the latest EU enlargement (Breuss 2001).  
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Figure 8 shows that according to the ECB’s proxy measure, which in Austria’s case 
includes administered service prices with an aggregate HICP weight of 5.5 percent, tax-
push inflation contributed significantly to Austrian headline inflation between October 
2001 and February 2003, but then stayed calm until the fall of 2004. Since October 2004, 
however, its contribution is on the rise again, currently running at 0.5 percentage points.  
No official index of government administered prices (GAP) or tax-push inflation exists in 
Austria. Statistics Austria has however published information on the matter on special 
occasions, most recently on 21 January 2004 (Statistics Austria 2004). According to the 
“Sonderauswertung VPI 2003”, which is based on the national CPI
10, fees and 
administered prices added: 0.418 percentage points to headline CPI in 2000, 0.681 
percentage points in 2001, 0.376 percentage points in 2002, and 0.072 percentage points 
in 2003. For 2004 Fluch and Rumler (2005) report a contribution close to 0.3 percentage 
points.
11 Compared to the ECB proxy measure, the national measure is more 
comprehensive as far as administered prices are concerned (8 percent share in overall 
prices compared to a 5.5 percent share), while tobacco (and hence the impact of tobacco 
                                                 
10 Since the fall of 2004 a significant gap has opened up between the inflation measures based on the 
national CPI and the HICP, largely owing to accelerating housing costs and differences in their treatment in 
the respective inflation measures.  While the HICP has a larger coverage of goods and services overall, the 
relative weight of housing costs in it is significantly lower than in the national measure, with owner-
occupied housing partly covered by the national measure but altogether excluded from the HICP (see 
Statistik Austria 2005, Haschka 2005).  
11 At the start of 2004, the “Krankenschein – Ambulanzgebühr” was abolished.  
  23tax increases) remains excluded. Specific indirect taxes on energy are also excluded, as 
are the regulated (rather than administered) prices of the liberalized network industries 
(telecommunications, gas and electricity).
12  
While GAP inflation is currently on the rise as well (due to health reform measures, 
reduced health insurance compensation for dental services, in particular), the sharp 
increase in tax-push inflation since January 2005 indicated by the ECB proxy measure 
largely reflects the rise in tobacco taxes that came into effect at the start of the year (with 
further increases being scheduled in coming years).  
Note then the following features about Austria’s role in the tax-push phenomenon:  
(1) Tax-push started early in Austria, as the country supposedly adhered to the 
rules and embarked on fiscal consolidation in what were supposedly “good times”. As a 
result, while the acceleration in inflation until mid-2000 was “more or less equal to that in 
other European countries, .. higher indirect taxes – implemented as part of the fiscal 
consolidation program – then lifted the rate of consumer price increases by another 
1/2 
percentage point to about 2
3/4 per cent” (OECD 2001, p. 36);  
  (2) peaking early by adding almost 0.7 percentage points in 2001, it also proved 
temporary at that time, so that the falling out of the index of the early measures 
subsequently contributed to the decline in Austrian inflation whereas tax-push gained 
prominence elsewhere over 2002-2004 – Austrian inflation decoupled from euro area 
developments in this phase (Fluch and Rumler 2005); 
(3) while Austria thus dampened inflation persistence until mid-2004, more 
recently, the country may have started to converge to the average despite having a 
significant margin left before facing official “excessive deficit” procedural troubles. The 
aims of achieving a balanced budget while reducing income and corporate tax burdens 
may well give rise to further tax-push doses, as one-off consolidation measures are 
                                                 
12 Considering product market liberalization since the late 1990s, a more comprehensive analysis of 
government influences on price developments reveals that while liberalization of telecommunications 
reduced overall inflation since 1998, the inflation dampening effects of liberalizing electricity and gas 
markets were counterbalanced by the introduction of energy taxes or rises in tariff charges (Pollan 2004, 
Fluch and Rumler 2005). The corresponding privatization proceeds have played an important role in 
Austria’s consolidation. According to the OECD (2003, p. 46), cuts in infrastructure investment in recent 
years were “largely due to spin offs of public sector units into the enterprise sector and privatizations”.  
  24becoming harder to get by, too. But given the country’s weight in the HICP of just 3.1 
percent, Austria will continue to have a limited impact on euro are price developments. 
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Figure 9 summarizes the situation. After a sharp recession-induced rise in 2001, Austria’s 
market-determined underlying inflation declined swiftly in subsequent years and is 
currently running at just over 1 percent – reflecting low and stable wage inflation. 




Headline HICP inflation accelerated even more sharply in Belgium in the years 1999-
2000 than in the euro area as a whole, reflecting the pronounced short-term sensitivity of 
consumption prices in Belgium to fluctuations in the oil price, which, in turn, is “largely 
attributable to the relatively lower excise duty on petrol, diesel and heating oil, and to the 
greater weight of those products in the consumer price index” (BNB 2004, p. 32). In 2002 
and 2003, Belgium’s headline inflation then fell sharply and well below the euro area-
wide measure.  
In view of its very high debt ratio Belgium was under special pressure to consolidate in 
order to qualify for EMU, cutting its deficit ratio to 2 percent by 1997. Greatly benefiting 
  25from a sharp reduction in the interest burden, Belgium’s budget balance subsequently 
moved into a small surplus (Bibow 2004c). Even today, Belgium’s budget shows only a 
small deficit so that the country is under no immediate SGP-imposed pressures; while its 
debt ratio has declined to around 90 percent in the meantime. Belgium’s weight in the 
HICP measure for the euro area is 3.34 percent. 
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According to the ECB proxy measure (see figure 10), tax-push inflation has only played a 
minor role in Belgium since 1999, except for the time between March 2003 and October 
2004 when tobacco prices added to the otherwise small and stable contribution of 
administered prices. Note that the administered service prices included in the ECB proxy 
measure only have an aggregate weight of 3 percent, about half the euro area average.   
While no official index of GAP or tax-push inflation exists in Belgium, research on the 
matter by the National Bank of Belgium yielded results that differ decidedly from what 
the ECB proxy measure indicates. The key feature about tax-push inflation in Belgium is 
the reversal of its impact on headline inflation: during the period from 1999 until 2003 
tax-push reduced headline inflation by between 0.1 and 0.3 percentage points every year, 
in 2004 and 2005, however, it added to headline inflation by approximately 0.1 to 0.2 
percentage points. In particular, between 2003 and 2004 a swing occurred in the impact 
of tax-push on headline prices of 0.4 percentage points (see NBB 2004, 2005).  
  26Deviating results are due to the fact that the National Bank of Belgium’s analysis is more 
comprehensive than the ECB proxy measure. For instance, the abolition or reduction of 
radio and television license fees and the impact of cuts in administered gas and electricity 
tariffs significantly reduced headline inflation in 2002 and 2003, none of which are 
captured by the ECB proxy measure. Neither are specific environmental levies and eco-
bonuses coming into effect in 2004 and 2005, nor changes in indirect taxes on petroleum 
products or regional indirect taxes on electricity and gas (called the Elia contribution) 
introduced to compensate for the revenue loss incurred by the municipalities following 
liberalization. One aspect captured by both measures is the impact of tobacco tax 
increases in 2004.  
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In summary, market-determined underlying inflation in Belgium rose at first in 2001 and 
until the spring of 2002, reflecting apart from the slump also an element of wage-
indexation in the Belgian collective wage settlement procedures, but fell quickly back 
thereafter, currently running at around 1 percent (see Figure 11). Belgium’s tax-push 
contribution to inflation persistence in the euro area was negative in 2002 and 2003, with 
the reversal of 2004 however adding to the plight more recently. Currently not facing 
acute SGP-imposed budgetary pressures, other motivations seem to dominate budgetary 
decisions in Belgium’s case. Administered service price inflation is stable and Belgium is 
not a key driver behind tax-push inflation in the euro area.  
  27 
Finland 
Finland went through a severe and prolonged economic crisis in the early 1990s, from 
which the country bounced back to sustained growth in 1994. The markka’s depreciation 
in 1991-93 of some thirty percent driving a twelve percentage point swing in the current 
account balance over the course of the decade played a key role in this. But domestic 
demand too saw almost uninterrupted growth since 1994. It was in this environment that 
Finland turned its budget deficit of 7 percent of GDP in 1993 into a budget surplus of 7 
percent of GDP by 2000. In 2001, however, the country’s fortunes turned again, as 
Finland was hit hard by the global slowdown, experiencing a swing in the net export 
contribution to GDP growth from +2.4 percent in 2000 to –0,5 percent in 2001. Finland is 
still running a current account surplus in the order of three to four percent of GDP, but in 
the context of accelerating house price inflation GDP growth has become largely 
domestic demand-driven in recent years. While the budgetary position has deteriorated, 
too, Finland still has a comfortable budget surplus of over 1 percent of GDP.  
Finland also stands out as the “best inflation performer among the ‘peripheral’ euro area 
countries” (OECD 2002, p. 32). That said, however, between 1999 and 2000 headline 
HICP inflation soared even more sharply in Finland than in the euro area as a whole, 
from a trough of 0.5 percent in January 1999 to 3.2 percent in March 2000. Similar to 
Belgium, this was related to above average oil consumption and below average taxation 
(OECD 2000). In the course of 2002, Finland’s inflation then started to undershoot the 
euro area’s, and increasingly so ever since. In the spring of 2004, inflation even turned 
negative, before bouncing up again in the context of rising energy costs. Finland’s weight 
in the euro area HICP is 1.589 percent.  
In accordance with its favorable budgetary position, the key public policy issue in 
Finland since the start of EMU has not been any budgetary squeeze
13, but how to best use 
                                                 
13 It is noteworthy though that Finland’s fiscal framework includes a so-called “emergency brake” stating 
that: “the government’s underlying premise is that the central government deficit, in national account 
terms, should not exceed 2 
3/4 per cent of GDP even in conditions of weak economic development. If, in the 
light of forecasts, the deficit threatens to grow larger than this, the government will, without delay, propose 
the necessary measures for reducing expenditures as well as other measures to avoid an overrun” (OECD 
2004, p. 44).   
  28any available leeway to relieve the country’s – by international standards – high tax 
burden, including high indirect taxation. Measures implemented in recent times featured 
cuts in indirect taxes. 
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According to the ECB proxy measure, which carries an aggregate HICP weight of 6 
percent (see figure 12), tax-push inflation has played a minor positive role in Finland’s 
case. While this owed to administered prices adding some 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points 
per year to headline inflation, administered service price inflation has actually slowed 
markedly in recent years from over five percent in 1999 to just over 2 percent of late – 
clearly against the trend in other countries. That administered prices still contribute 
positively to headline inflation in a way also reflects the fact that market-determined 
underlying inflation has fallen to extremely low levels, currently around 0.5 percent (see 
Figure 13). 
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No national index of administered prices exists in Finland. However, as is practice in 
other Scandinavian countries too, Statistics Finland calculates a net price index (NPI) and 
corresponding tax rate index (TRI) that capture the effects of indirect taxes and subsidies 
on consumer prices. The NPI is obtained when the effect of indirect taxes and subsidies is 
removed from the CPI. The TRI measures the development of the rates of indirect taxes 
and subsidies having an impact on consumption expenditure, covering both the explicit 
effect on the prices of commodities included in the CPI as well as the implicit effect on 
them through intermediate consumption. The TRI primarily includes commodity taxes 
and subsidies in accordance with the national accounts. In addition, the operating surplus 
of government monopolies pricing their output above production costs are also viewed as 
indirect taxes; with public ownership still playing a large and privatization so far a very 
small role in Finland, as reflected in the country’s net debt ratio of minus 40 percent. 
Other items considered as indirect taxes include fees for permits and (passport and 
driving) licenses, and a automobile tax, for instance. The TRI thus provides a 
comprehensive measure of IT inflation, and more than that.  
  30Figure 14. Finland's net price index (NPI) clarifies situation 
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Based on Finland’s national CPI
14, Figure 14 shows that in 2000-2001 and again since 
the spring of 2003 the NPI rose much faster than the CPI, which implies that the indirect 
tax component rose by significantly less than consumer prices and thus reduced headline 
inflation.
15 This component far outweighs the small positive contribution from 
administered prices (indicated by the ECB proxy measures) and mainly reflects the 
reductions in car taxation from January 2003 and alcohol taxation from March 2004 as 
well as the rise in energy taxation in 2003; none of which are captured by the ECB proxy 
measure.  
In summary, it seems clear that the ECB proxy measure does not provide a realistic 
picture of the situation in Finland at all. If anything, given Finland’s favorable budgetary 
situation, tax-push inflation seems to have reduced headline inflation in recent times. The 
Bank of Finland confirmed this proposition: “A crude approximation in case of Finland .. 
would be that the contribution of administered prices and indirect taxes to overall HICP is 
negative, at around -0,5 to -0,8 [percentage points] in 2004” (Bank of Finland, email to 
the author of August 2005).   
 
                                                 
14 Deviations between the national CPI and HICP, especially pronounced in 2000-2002, mainly reflect 
differences in the treatment of housing costs (owner occupied housing in particular).  
15 It is also noteworthy that the reverse was true during Finland’s fiscal retrenchment until 1997 (OECD 
2000, p. 34).   
  31France 
Stark differences in fiscal policy traditions between France and Germany could be 
observed during the 1990s, with Germany pursuing a pro-cyclical consolidation strategy 
whereas France opted for an anti-cyclical one (Bibow 2004c). Repeating old patterns, it 
seems, since 2001, France delayed fiscal retrenchment as long as it could, even boosting 
real public consumption expenditures to 4.6 percent in 2002, while pro-cyclical fiscal 
retrenchment once again characterized the German situation; with fiscal relief in 2001 
being focused on corporate taxes.
16
Alas, with the budget balance surpassing the three percent ceiling in that year, SGP-
wisdom has meanwhile caught up with France, too. At a mere 1.4 percent rate, real public 
consumption expenditures are still growing a lot faster than in Germany (-0.1) today, but 
as far as tax-push inflation is concerned France has become even more similar to 
Germany.  
According to the ECB proxy measure, which in France’s case includes administered 
service prices with an aggregate HICP weight of five percent (see Figure 15), tax-push 
inflation has greatly distorted France’s headline inflation upwards since the end of 2002. 
While tax-push still only added 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points to headline inflation in 2002, 
its role increased sharply in the course of 2003 to little less than 1 percentage point by 
yearend, a level from which it only started to decline again from October 2004 onwards 
to currently around 0.2 – 0.3 percentage points.  
                                                 
16 Interestingly, France’s and Germany’s performances were almost like mirror images in more than just 
one respect. While GDP growth has slowed markedly since 2001 in France too, a decomposition of 
France’s growth shows that while the GDP growth contribution of net exports, which had been generally 
positive throughout the 1990s, turned negative since 2001, France’s domestic demand growth held up far 
better than in Germany’s case. Accordingly, whereas Germany’s current account position has increased to 
4 percent of GDP, France’s surplus of 3 percent of GDP in 1999 has meanwhile turned into a current 
account deficit of around 1 percent of GDP. 
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This decline is largely due to the wearing off of the earlier tobacco tax hike. By contrast, 
GAP inflation, which started to accelerate sharply in late 2002, is pacing ahead at three 
times the rate of market-determined underlying inflation; with the latter currently running 
at about 1.5 percent (see Figure 16); well above Germany’s level as France’s wage 
inflation has not yet succumbed to German levels. It is noteworthy that while tobacco tax 
increases also led to a temporary upward distortion previously in 1997, as part of 
France’s efforts to make it below the three percent budget hurdle, the major role played 
today by GAP inflation is a new phenomenon. 
Figure 16. Market-determined core inflation in France
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  33The full extent of the reversal in tax-push inflation is not revealed by the ECB proxy 
measure though, since it does not include VAT changes. For back in 1999-2000 cuts in 
indirect taxes (VAT standard rate reductions of April 2000, in particular) were one factor 
behind the very low inflation at that time. And as the temporary effect of the VAT cuts in 
2000 wore off, this was one factor behind the inflation spurt that occurred in 2001. 
INSEE, France’s statistical office, calculates an index of underlying inflation which 
excludes administered prices and fiscal measures as well as especially volatile prices, 
referred to in Banque de France publications (see Banque de France 2004, 2005). The 
Banque de France in there attributes 0.6 percentage points of France’s inflation rate in 
2003 to fiscal measures and administered prices, and 0.7 percentage points in 2004. As to 
the euro area as a whole, the respective figures given there are 0.4 and 0.7 percentage 
points. Note that this is well in excess of what the ECB proxy measure suggests.
17  
In summary, given the country’s weight in the euro area HICP of some 20.696 percent, 
France has no doubt been one of the key drivers behind tax-push inflation in the euro area 
in recent years. A sharp reversal occurred between 2000, when France was growing 
strongly and budgetary leeway was partly used for tax reductions, including cuts in VAT, 
and 2002 when the country got into conflict with the three percent ceiling of the SGP. 
Given that France continues facing SGP-imposed budgetary pressures, the country’s 
contribution to the tax-push phenomenon may be here to stay.   
 
Greece 
Since 1997 and until recently Greece has enjoyed fast GDP growth around 4 percent per 
year. GDP growth was wholly domestic demand-driven, while net exports generally 
subtracted around 1 percentage point from it. As the euro and hence the interest rate 
convergence process arrived in Greece with a two-year delay, the country sailed through 
the 2001 global slowdown and right to the Athens Olympic Games of 2004, only to wake 
up to the truth of the SGP a little later. While investment has plunged already, public 
consumption too seems ripe now for a real crunch as revisions showed the country’s 
                                                 
17 Similarly, the IMF (2005a, p. 8-9) calculated that administered price hikes “cut some 0.7 and 0.4 
percentage point off real disposable incomes in 2004 and 2005, respectively”. 
  34budget deficit far exceeding the three percent limit ever since 2000 and in excess of 6 
percent of GDP in 2004. Greece’s government has committed itself to cutting the deficit 
below 4 percent of GDP in 2005 and to 2.9 percent next year. Measures to achieve this 
aim include a one-percentage point increase in VAT and higher excise duty, imposed in 
March 2005 (Financial Times 21 June 2005). 
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As Figure 17 shows, based on the ECB proxy measure with a weight of around 7 percent 
in Greece’s consumption basket, tax-push inflation has played a role in Greece since 
2001, albeit only a small one in relation to the comparatively high level of market-
determined inflation. In fact, market-determined core inflation in Greece is stable at a 
three-percent level (see Figure 18) – well in excess of the euro area average.
18 A tobacco 
tax increase played a role for a year starting in September 2003. Otherwise administered 
service price inflation around 5 percent has contributed continuously to headline inflation 
by about 0.3 – 0.4 percentage points since 2001. It may well be that this factor reflects 
relatively high public sector wage inflation rather than genuine consolidation measures – 
                                                 
18 The Balassa-Samuelson effect may be partly responsible for Greece’s higher inflation. But the OECD 
(2001, pp. 27-8) also refers to an experience which Greece is sharing with other former high-inflation 
countries in Europe’s south: “Wage moderation in recent years has led to very moderate nominal wage 
increases by Greek standards and sharply declining unit labor costs. The latter still rose at a rate of 9.3 per 
cent in 1997, but have come down to an estimated 2 per cent in 2000. Yet, wage moderation has gone even 
further in many other euro area countries.”  
  35as yet. More important is that ECB proxy measure fails to reveal the most interesting 
facts about true tax-push in Greece.  
Figure 18. Market-determined core inflation in Greece
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The point is that negative tax-push inflation seems to have played an important role in 
Greece’s dash below the Maastricht inflation criterion in the late 1990s. The OECD 
(2001, p. 28) observes that: “permanent cuts in indirect taxes on petrol, heating oil, 
electricity and cars have helped to restrain price increases. Such cuts were gradually 
introduced between October 1998 and December 1999. Official estimates suggest that 
they reduced average annual consumer price inflation by 0.9 percentage points in 1999”. 
Today, the SGP-imposed consolidation measures are having the opposite effect on 
headline inflation. That is, another reversal is at play here, but none of all this is reflected 
in the ECB proxy measure. While these developments will have little impact on the euro 
area’s HICP given the country’s weight of only 2.745 percent in it, Greece promises to 
remain an interesting case to study the tax-push phenomenon as such. Alas, no national 
measure is available either it seems.   
 
Ireland 
Ever since its growth take-off in the mid1990s, Ireland has been Europe’s star performer. 
Both EU transfers as well as large-scale foreign direct investment played a key role in the 
  36country’s investment and export-driven growth that in some years featured double-digit 
GDP growth rates; and a correspondingly rapid decline in its public debt ratio (Bibow 
2004). While net exports continue to contribute around 2 percentage points to GDP 
growth, investment (non-residential and more recently residential investment too) has 
slowed markedly since the peak of the boom in 2000. Since late 1999 and until recently 
Ireland also experienced the highest inflation rate in the euro area, with HICP peaking at 
6 percent in November 2000 (national CPI inflation, 7 percent) and only declining below 
three percent in the course of last year.  
Back in 2000, Ireland had a budget surplus of more than 4 percent of GDP. More 
recently, the budget has been in a near-balanced position. Nonetheless, Ireland was the 
first country to be warned by the European Commission back in 2001 when it made use 
of its fiscal leeway by cutting direct taxes (as the government’s part in the Programme for 
Prosperity and Fairness agreed with social partners). Indirect taxes, by contrast, have 
been on the rise.  
According to the ECB proxy measure (see Figure 19), which includes administered 
service prices with an aggregate weight of 5 percent in the overall HICP, tax-push 
inflation contributed significantly to headline HICP inflation between December 1999 
and October 2000 and then again since 2002 until today. 









1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Source. ECB, Eurostat (July 2005) Note. The ECB proxy measure only captures the role of tobacco products 





























  37As to the first occasion, the measure properly captures the one-off impact of an increase 
of tobacco excise duties, which added about 0.75 percentage point to the CPI over the 
period in question, before dropping out of the index again in December 2000 (OECD 
2001, p. 37-9). Further tobacco tax increases then followed in December 2002 and 
December 2003, the effects of which only vanished from the index by late 2004; a factor 
which thus contributed to the decline in Ireland’s HICP inflation to the 2 percent level in 
early 2005. On the other hand, administered service price inflation began to accelerated 
sharply to an annual rate around 10 percent in 2000 and is currently still running at little 
less than that, continuously adding between 0.3 to 0.5 percentage points to HICP headline 
inflation since 2001.  
While no national index of administered prices is available, developments regarding 
indirect taxes may also be investigated on the basis of Ireland’s national CPI and a more 
comprehensive measure of indirect taxes calculated by Ireland’s Central Statistics Office 
(CSO). CSO publishes a “Constant Tax (consumer) Price Index” (CTPI) which is 
designed to exclude from the CPI the effect of changes in the level of indirect taxes since 
the base reference period. Effectively, this measure excludes two effects: first, the impact 
due to changes in the tax regime and, second, the impact of the “ad valorem effect” on 
tax receipts of changes in the pre-tax level of prices of goods and services. In addition, 
the CSO also publishes an estimate of the “immediate direct contribution of changes in 
the tax regime on the monthly CPI according as the changes are implemented in practice” 
(CSO 2005, p. 21), which excludes any ad valorem impact.  






































As figure 20 shows, this national measure (base December 2001 = 100) confirms that 
indirect taxes contributed significantly to headline inflation in Ireland in the years 2002 to 
2004, even more so than the ECB proxy measure would suggest. This is due to the fact 
that while tobacco tax increases featured prominently other measures included VAT 
increases as well as hikes in various other excise duties (energy, alcohol) and the vehicle 
registration tax, for instance (OECD 2003).  
Given its favorable budgetary position, no immediate SGP-imposed pressures have been 
the driving force behind tax-push inflation in Ireland. Rather, a more general shift away 
from direct toward indirect taxation may have been at play, it seems, combined with the 
working of the Balassa-Samuelson effect in the context of high public sector wage 
inflation as far as administered service price inflation is concerned. Overall, there is no 
denying that tax-push inflation is part of the explanation of Ireland’s rather high inflation 
until recently, even if for reasons other than SGP pressures. But given the country’s 
weight in the euro area HICP of just 1.321 percent it is also clear that Ireland played only 
a minor role in the phenomenon of inflation persistence which characterizes the euro area 
until today. Meanwhile, Ireland’s headline HICP inflation has declined toward two 
percent while market-determined core inflation is running at around 1.5 percent (see 
Figure 21). 
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Italy’s manufacturing sector has not emerged from recession since the 2001 slowdown, as 
competitiveness and export performance deteriorated sharply since the late 1990s. A 
current account surplus of some three percent of GDP by the mid 1990s has meanwhile 
turned into a deficit of two percent. Private consumption and residential investment fared 
somewhat better at first than in Germany, in particular. But domestic demand was further 
crushed when budgetary pressures hit public consumption in 2003. After extensive use of 
one-off budgetary measures in recent years, Italy may have little leeway left over by now. 
With its deficit of three percent of GDP in 2004 forecast to rise steeply, the country is 
facing strong SGP-imposed pressures today.   
Italy’s inflation has been generally higher than the euro area average. Core inflation rose 
from its two percent level to three percent over 2002 and 2003, and has remained stuck at 
a two percent level since 2004. The OECD (2000, 2001, 2003, 2005) attributes this 
mainly to a decline in productivity growth and structural rigidities, which have kept wage 
inflation and profit margins up. Running at around three percent per year wage inflation 
in Italy is higher than in Germany, but low by any reasonable standard.   
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According to the ECB proxy measure (see figure 22), which in Italy’s case includes 
administered service prices with an aggregate weight of 5 percent, tax-push inflation 
emerged as a significant force in 2002 and has pushed up headline inflation by between 
0.2 and 0.5 percentage points in recent years. This mainly reflects a series of tobacco tax 
increases starting in 2003. By contrast, there was a continuous contribution from 
administered service prices of only 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points annually.  
Figure 23. CPI confirms that regulated service prices so far not the issue








































  41Based on the national consumer price index, the Italian Central Statistical Office (Istat) 
calculates a sub-index of regulated service prices, distinguishing further as to whether 
regulation takes place at the local or national level. Figure 23 shows a steady decline in 
headline CPI inflation from just below three percent in early 2003 to below two percent 
in late 2004, with non-regulated service price inflation generally running at about one 
percentage point higher. A curious contrast emerges as to regulated service prices: while 
locally regulated ones increased at a rate similar to non-regulated service prices, 
nationally regulated ones had been significantly lower lower than that until May 2004, 
when they temporarily increased sharply. While anecdotal evidence might suggest 
otherwise, this index based on the CPI confirms the result from the ECB proxy measure: 
administered service price inflation has so far not played any great role in Italy.   
The Banca d’ Italia’s analysis further corroborates this result. Looking at both regulated 
service as well as goods prices, the bank observes: “The contribution of regulated prices 
to the year-on-year increase in the general index in 2004 amounted to 0.3 percentage 
points, largely attributable to the increase in the prices of tobacco products (about 10 per 
cent) and some local services (water, waste disposal and public transport). By contrast, 
the prices of regulated energy products (gas and electricity) helped slow the rise in the 
general index owing to the lag with which they are adjusted to changes in the prices of 
energy sources” (Bank of Italy 2005, p. 40).  
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  42While this suggests that the lagged effects of rising international energy prices might 
affect Italian headline inflation in the near future, the surprising result remains that so far 
tax-push inflation has not played much of a role in Italy. This stands in sharp contrast to 
the situation in France and Germany. Seen in a slightly different light, it is of some 
interest that the reduction in the dispersion of headline inflation rates in the euro area in 
2004 owed decidedly to divergent trends in tax-push inflation. Underlying inflation 
trends better reveal the true situation though. As Figure 24 shows, Italy’s market-
determined core inflation is still running at two percent – compared to near-zero in 
Germany and one percent in France. Given Italy’s budgetary situation, it is not unlikely 
that tax-push inflation will play a bigger role in Italy too in coming years. With a weight 
of 19.241 percent in the euro area HICP, this is bound to impact markedly on euro area 
headline inflation.    
 
Luxembourg 
After enjoying a span of remarkably strong GDP growth in the second half of the 1990s, 
the Grande Duché has not escaped the 2001 slowdown unscathed. While cuts in direct 
taxes supported disposable incomes in 2001-2002, Luxembourg is today among the 
brigade of countries plagued with subdued domestic demand growth. Continuing to 
benefit from a large net export contributions to GDP growth, public consumption too is 
set to decelerate further, as the budget surplus of some six percent of GDP around the 
turn of the century has meanwhile turned into a small deficit.  
Luxembourg’s headline inflation is especially volatile and has been on the high side 
among euro area countries back in 2000 and again today. The OECD (2001, 2003) 
blames automatic indexation for delaying the response of wage inflation. Also, in 
Luxembourg’s case, the introduction of euro coins and notes is estimated to have added a 
hefty 0.7 percentage points to headline inflation from January 2001 to July 2002. It is 
noteworthy that tax-push inflation too has featured prominently in Luxembourg’s 
consumer price developments since 2001.  
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According to the ECB’s proxy measure (see figure 25), which includes administered 
service prices with an aggregate HICP weight of only 3.6 percent, starting in mid 2001 
and until today tax-push inflation has contributed between 0.3 and 1 percentage point to 
headline HICP inflation. This has largely owed to a whole series of tobacco tax increases. 
In addition, administered service prices grew strongly in 2003 and until mid 2004.  
The national authorities are well aware of the tax-push phenomenon and national studies 
show that the ECB proxy measure greatly underestimates its importance. The 2003 
Annual Report of the Banque Centrale du Luxembourg ([BCL] 2004a, p. 13) observes 
that “numerous factors explain the stickiness of underlying inflation observed in 200[3], 
notably, the increases in the prices of public utilities and tobacco, the increase in the 
minimum wage in the beginning of the year, the impact of the past two wage indexation 
tranches, the generalization of parking fees in Luxembourg City, the rises in the prices of 
medical and dental services, as well as the impact of the summer heat wave on the prices 
of unprocessed food”. Further actions were then implemented in 2004 that are not 
captured by the ECB proxy measure either, like increases in VAT and the level of excise 
duties on fuel, for instance.  
It is estimated that the “impact des measures gouvernementales” on the national CPI 
amounted to: 0.4 percentage points in 2003 and 0.5 percentage points in each 2004 and 
2005. The impact on the HICP is estimated to have been even higher, namely: 1.0 
  44percentage point in 2003, 1.5 percentage points in 2004, and 1.7 percentage points in 
2005 (BCL 2004a, p. 27). More details underlying this analysis appeared in the Bulletin 
2004/3 (BCL 2004b), including ad hoc calculations of the impact of changes in indirect 
taxes other than excise duties on tobacco products.
19 The study distinguished between an 
index “prix administres restreint”, equivalent to the administered service price component 
in the ECB proxy measure with an aggregate weight of 3.6 percent, and an index “prix 
administers large”, which, presumably, better describes the true situation in Luxembourg, 
featuring an aggregate weight of 8.8 percent (or even 10.9 percent for the NICP).  
In summary, given the country’s weight in the euro area HICP of only 0.279 percent, 
Luxembourg contributed correspondingly little to inflation persistence in the euro area. 
Clearly, though, tax-push inflation has played an increasingly important role in keeping 
Luxembourg’s inflation up in recent years (see also BCL 2004c, Lünnemann and Mathä 
2004). While other possible motivations cannot be ruled out, the phenomenon’s rising 
importance coincided with the country’s deteriorating budgetary position; without 
Luxembourg facing any immediate SGP-imposed pressures as yet. Luxembourg’s 
headline inflation remains high and volatile by euro area standards, while core inflation 
has declined to around 1.5 percent (see Figure 26). 
                                                 
19 As to tobacco products, Luxembourg is peculiar since this product category has a weight of no less than 
9.3 percent in the HICP compared to a weight of only 1.6 percent in the NICP, the difference reflecting 
consumption by non-residents. This implies that while the HICP properly measures both the fiscal 
importance to Luxembourg of tobacco tax increases as well as the price impact for the euro area as a whole, 
the impact on the purchasing power of residents of Luxembourg is much smaller (BCL 2005). 
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Starting to overheat in the late 1990s, the 2.5 percentage points VAT increase in 2001 
seems to have played a rather critical role in ending the supposedly “miraculous” 
performance of the Dutch economy.
20 As indirect tax increases pushed headline HICP 
inflation up decidedly, peaking at over five percent in the fall of 2001, this factor dealt a 
death blow to wage moderation for several years (until a new Accord was reached in 
October 2003 for a freezing of nominal wages over 2004-5.) Despite its structural budget 
balance in 2000, in compliance with the SGP, the country faced an excessive deficit 
procedure in 2003 when its deficit ratio exceeded 3 percent. Acting swiftly, four 
consolidation packages were enacted “with a cumulative effect of some € 20 billion (3.8 
per cent of GDP) by 2007” (OECD 2004, p. 15).  
Commenting on inflation persistence the Nederlandse Bank recently declared: “Over the 
past few years the Netherlands has seen HICP react more strongly to the economy than 
has been the case in the euro area at large. Between 2001 and 2003, for instance, 
economic growth fell by 2.3 percentage points in the Netherlands and HICP inflation 
                                                 
20 Bibow (2001b) argues that the “Dutch model” was based on little else but a systematic wage 
underbidding strategy that worked well for a small and very open economy like the Netherlands, but has 
absolutely nothing to offer in terms of advice to larger economies like Germany or Euroland.  
  46came down 2.9 percentage points, compared with economic growth at 1.1 percentage 
points and HICP inflation at 0.3 percentage point for the euro area” (DNB, Quarterly 
Bulletin March 2005, p. 19).  
This comment misses the mark by far. Since tax-push inflation has played a very big role 
in the Netherlands, and even before it took off in other parts of the euro area in 2002, the 
phenomenon has masked the responsiveness of market-determined inflation trends 
greatly. The point is that Dutch tax-push and overall price developments were out of sync 
with developments elsewhere. For one thing, Dutch headline inflation declined sharply 
after 2001 exactly for the fact that the 2.5 percentage point VAT hike of the year before 
vanished from the scene.  
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The ECB proxy measure (see Figure 27), which includes administered service prices with 
an aggregate HICP weight of eight percent, cannot properly capture this facture since it 
does not account for VAT changes. Nonetheless the measure does reveal that tax-push 
has played a significant role in the Netherlands since 2001, and especially in 2004 when 
it added around one percentage point to headline HICP at times.
21 The driving force 
behind tax push in the Netherlands has changed though: until 2001 it mainly reflected a 
shift from direct to indirect taxation, whereas in recent years budgetary pressures have 
gained the upper hand. In any case, and similar to Germany, core inflation has meanwhile 
                                                 
21 Measures included a sharp price increase in the compulsory health system (Ziekenfondswet).  
  47fallen to an extremely low level of around 0.5 percent reflecting nominal wage 
developments (see Figure 27).  








1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005





























Based on the NICP, Statistics Netherlands (CBS) publishes five different variants of 
underlying inflation measures, featuring among them also an index that excludes the 
effects of changes in the rates of product-related taxes (e.g. VAT and excise duties on 
alcohol and tobacco) and subsidies. In contrast to the Irish constant-tax CPI, the Dutch 
“derived CPI” index does not measure the “ad valorem effect”. In contrast to the Finish 
NPI, only the direct effect of tax changes is taken into account in the monthly series 
(while estimates that include the indirect effects as well are published quarterly).
22 In 
addition, the Dutch derived CPI also holds constant “consumption-related taxes and 
government services” due to local authorities, which form group 13000 in the Dutch CPI 
including: real estate tax, motor vehicle tax, sewerage charge, waste taxes, charges paid 
to the Dutch Water boards, fees on passports and driver’s licences, tuition fees, etc.
23 This 
indicates that the term “tax” is interpreted broadly here to include some charges and fees 
that would show up in measures of administered prices elsewhere (Germany, for 
                                                 
22 No such series derived from the HICP for the Netherlands is available as yet. However, the methodology 
underlying the Dutch measure (see De Haan 1998) has become the model for a EU-wide project for such an 
index piloted by Eurostat.   
23 Consumption-related taxes included in the Dutch CPI include items that are not included in the HICP 
(like motor vehicle tax, for instance), one factor which explains the deviation between the two measures in 
2001-2002.  
  48instance). The aggregate weight of group 13000 in the CPI is 3.4 percent – which is 
significantly lower than the 8 percent for the administered service group included in the 
ECB proxy measure though. According to Figure 29, prices included in group 13000 of 
the Dutch CPI stayed calm in 2001, but then played a key role in 2003-2004. For the time 
being, tax-push inflation in the Netherlands has calmed down since the start of 2005.
24  
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Portugal enjoyed strong GDP growth in the second half of the 1990s, but slumped 
together with much of the rest of the euro area (except for its neighbour Spain) in 2001. 
Together with Germany, the country was singled out by the European Commission in 
early 2002 to receive an “early warning”. Later in the year, the Council decided that 
Portugal was running an excessive deficit. Facing the threat of a SGP penalty, the country 
began to impose brutal fiscal austerity measures in 2002. According to OECD’s (2005) 
latest estimates (Economic Outlook no. 77), the structural primary deficit improved by 
three percentage points between 2001 and 2003. The financial deficit shrank temporarily, 
                                                 
24 The ECB’s projections of June 2, 2005, even include a one-off (0.2 percentage point) reduction in the 
area-wide price level in 2006 projected to result from a health care reform in the Netherlands. In 2006, the 
Netherlands will introduce a compulsory private health insurance for essential curative care (OECD 2004, 
p. 76) which is supposed to lead to price-reducing efficiency gains. Related to this households experienced 
a significant rise in the tax burden over 2004-5 the price effects of which may be incompletely captured by 
the tax-push measures above.  
  49but bounced back to well above its 2001 level in 2005 though – as the country sank into 
severe crisis.  
Earlier than elsewhere, tax-push gained prominence in Portugal in 2002, as consolidation 
attempts included a two percentage point hike of the standard VAT rate (as of June 2002; 
Banco de Portugal 2004). This is estimated to have led to an increase in headline inflation 
by at least 0.5 percentage points (OECD 2003, p. 32)
25, and thus partly explains the 
conspicuous inflation differential between Portugal and the euro area average at the time. 
The same holds for tax hikes on oil in 2003.  
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None of this is revealed by the ECB proxy measure (see figure 30), which includes 
administered service prices with an aggregate HICP weight of roughly 5 percent. The 
proxy measure does however show that administered service prices rose at a high rate and 
contributed around 0.4 percentage points to headline HICP inflation in recent years. Most 
recent measures enacted by the Portuguese government to bring the deficit back below 
three percent of GDP included another VAT rate hike to 21 percent (Financial Times 
Deutschland 31 May 2005). Further increases in excise duties on oil products and 
tobacco, for instance, are in the pipeline. Portugal’s tax structure already features an 
unusually heavy reliance on consumption taxes (OECD 2001, p. 73), which is 
                                                 
25 Banco de Portugal (2004, p. 156, fn. 3) estimates that in case of full pass-through the theoretical impact 
on the CPI were 0.8 percentage points in 2002 and 0.6 in 2003.  
  50problematic in view of significantly lower rates in neighbouring Spain. Meanwhile, both 
headline as well as market-determined core inflation have declined below 2 percent (see 
figure 31). 









1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Sources. ECB, Eurostat





























Given the country’s weight in the euro area HICP of just 2.129 percent Portugal’s tax-
push inflation does not have much of an impact on area wide developments.
26 But the 
country seems to exemplify particularly well how procyclical consolidation attempts may 




Spain’s GDP growth since the mid 1990s has been remarkable. The country escaped from 
the 2001 slowdown and is enjoying strong domestic-demand driven growth until today; 
overcompensating a strong export drag and a soaring external imbalance. As record-high 
unemployment rates have halved since 1992, budgetary developments were accordingly. 
                                                 
26 In its latest projections of summer 2005, the Banco de Portugal foresees that a positive inflation 
differential will assert itself again in 2006: “Inflation projections for 2005 and 2006 for Portugal are largely 
conditioned by the impacts that the rise in indirect taxes considered in this forecast exercise will have on 
consumer prices. With regard to the rise in the standard VAT rate from 19 to 21 per cent, the effect on the 
annual average inflation rate is estimated to be 0.3 and 0.4 percentage points in 2005 and 2006, 
respectively.”     
27 No national indices or studies on the price effects of administered prices and changes in indirect taxes 
currently exist in Portugal (Banco de Portugal, email, August 2005).  
  51Apart from strong employment growth Spain has also benefited from nominal interest 
rates falling below nominal GDP growth at the start of EMU. In recent years, Spain’s 
budgetary position has been roughly balanced. Any fiscal leeway has been used for tax 
cuts which further bolstered domestic demand – since the country is not facing any 
immediate SGP pressures. 
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Correspondingly, while inflation in Spain is well above the euro area average (OECD 
2001, 2003), tax-push inflation according to the ECB proxy measure
28, which includes 
administered service prices with an aggregate HICP weight of 5 percent, has played no 
significant part in it (see figure 32). In fact, a more detailed analysis shows that Spain at 
times even used indirect taxes to reduce cost pressures. For instance, in 2000, excise 
taxes on fuels, tobacco and alcohol were frozen at their 1999 rates (rather than raised in 
line with inflation as indexation would require) and certain expenditures moved to the 
lower VAT rate category (OECD 2000, p. 42). Overall, in Spain indirect tax increases 
have featured as part of a general shift away from direct toward indirect taxation rather 
than budgetary pressures playing any role; just as tax-push inflation has played no role in 
                                                 
28 No measure or study of the price effects of administered prices and changes in indirect taxes seems to 
exist in Spain’s case.   
  52inflation developments in Spain.
29 No national indices of administered service prices or 
indirect taxes seem to exist.  
 
Some preliminary conclusions 
(1) The country-level analysis confirms that tax-push inflation has been a prime mover 
behind price developments in the euro area since the 2001 slowdown. To the extent that 
such measures exist, national measures – which generally better approximate the 
phenomenon – indicate that the ECB proxy measure, if anything, underestimates the 
magnitude of the tax-push contribution to headline inflation.  
(2) The phenomenon of tax-push inflation has not arisen in a uniform way across the euro 
area though. Key to the overall effect on HICP inflation have been France and Germany. 
In these two countries tax push may have explained almost half of overall inflation at 
times. Italy, where tax push so far seems to have played only a minor role, stands in sharp 
contrast to developments in the other two big countries. This is also true for medium-
sized Spain. Of the smaller countries, all except Finland saw an increase in importance of 
the phenomenon in recent years.  
(3) The country-level analysis also yielded evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
budgetary pressures may be the key motive or force behind resorting to consolidation 
measures that cause tax-push inflation. This may be most severe in cases of countries 
facing excessive deficit procedures. But it also applies to countries that have experienced 
a significant deterioration in their budgetary position, though not facing any acute SGP-
imposed budgetary squeeze yet.  
(4) The magnitude of the tax-push phenomenon increased markedly between 2001 and 
2004. It may have eased somewhat since the start of 2005 but remains considerable – and 
with the prospect of regaining new prominence in the near future.  
                                                 
29 The OECD’s (2001, p. 40-42) inflation decomposition exercise shows that net indirect taxes in 1999 and 
2000 ‘rose more rapidly in Spain than in the rest of the euro area’. However, this seems to reflect improved 
VAT tax collection and strong consumption growth rather than hikes in indirect tax rates. As to the 
renewed strong growth in this component in 2003 and 2004, “in the context of a lack of changes in indirect 
taxation”, the Banco de España (2005, p. 123) refers to the possibility of data distortions.  
  53(5) Most importantly, ignoring the relevance of tax-push inflation may easily lead to 
misinterpretations regarding the persistence in inflation observed in the euro area in 
recent years. For when tax-push is taken proper account for, market-determined core 
inflation has indeed declined significantly since 2001, and to very low levels today 
indeed. Market-determined core inflation in the euro area is currently running at little 
more than one percent (see Figure 33).  
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The point to be investigated in the next section is whether the ECB may have dealt itself 
a great disservice in refusing to provide more accommodation to the ailing euro area 
economy.   
 
6. Assessing the relevance and implications of the tax-push phenomenon to 
policymakers in the light of theory 
The previous section provided ample descriptive empirical evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that the apparent persistence in inflation since 2001 may have arisen as a 
consequence rather than despite of prolonged stagnation. Not market rigidities are then to 
blame for stagnation cum inflation persistence, but all too rigid macroeconomic policies; 
too rigid when it comes to effectively countering a slump in domestic demand. In this 
section, the analysis turns to an investigation of the role that macroeconomic policies 
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for assessing the functionality of monetary and fiscal policies as they have actually 
played out in recent years under Maastricht-style EMU conditions in section 7.  
Two fundamental questions have to be addressed. One concerns the interactions and the 
coordination between fiscal and monetary policies. The other concerns the appropriate 
price index monetary policy should best focus on. It turns out that the two issues may be 
more closely related than is widely appreciated, particularly under Maastricht-style EMU 
conditions.   
Interactions between fiscal and monetary policy are generally viewed exclusively from 
the perspective that fiscal policies can have adverse effects (or, spillovers) on monetary 
policy. Therefore a remarkable one-sidedness of the conventional approach to the issue 
may at once be attested. Accordingly, coordination between fiscal and monetary policies 
is quickly seen as potentially harmful if it might compromise monetary policy it its 
commitment to price stability. In other words, the sole concern in the modern literature
30 
is with the potential threats that fiscal policies might pose to monetary policy and price 
stability, while, curiously, no such threats are perceived to exist in the opposite direction. 
If any impact of monetary policy on fiscal policy is discussed at all, the issue is certainly 
not that monetary policy can conceivably go astray too, be inappropriately tight in 
particular, but that fiscal policy simply has to react to any rise in interest rates (and, 
hence, interest service) by increasing the primary surplus accordingly; thereby obeying 
the solvency constraint. As nothing seems simpler than that, the euro area’s finance 
ministers’ notorious refusal to do the obvious would seem truly puzzling.  
In a way, the presumed “deficit bias” in fiscal policy (or, tendency toward fiscal 
profligacy) is the counterpart to the alleged inflation bias in “discretionary” monetary 
policy arrangements that has received much attention in the literature and in policy 
debates following the seminal papers by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and 
Gordon (1983) on the time-inconsistency problem. As regards monetary policy, in theory, 
a simple solution to the whole matter appears to suggest itself: central bank 
independence. And once a central bank is judged as being sufficiently independent in 
                                                 
30 See Buti 2003 and Beetsma and Debrun 2004 for recent reviews.  
  55practice, academic researchers tend to view the problem as having been solved too. A key 
presumption here is that the right institutions guarantee the right policy conduct.  
Things are trickier when it comes to fiscal policy though. Here the emphasis in the 
literature is not on independence, but “rules” – constraints that appropriately “discipline” 
fiscal conduct. For disciplined fiscal conduct is necessary to assure the dominance of 
monetary policy. Without such dominance, or even threats to the credibility of the 
independent central bank, price stability would be at risk. If a central bank might be 
forced to “monetize” budget deficits its supposed independence is hollowed out, on this 
view. 
As the following quotation makes clear, theoretical support for this way of thinking is 
generally attributed to Sargent and Wallace’s (1981) seminal paper on some supposedly 
“unpleasant monetarist arithmetic”:  
“Monetary union in Europe has been influenced by debate in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The national central banks of EU countries, and in particular the Bundesbank, had a 
decisive influence on the design of EMU proposed in the Delors report (Delors, 1989). 
Central bank independence and a rule-based fiscal policy came to be regarded as a 
way to ensure monetary leadership. In order to avoid Sargent and Wallace’s 
unpleasant arithmetic, a particular emphasis was put on the need to ensure budgetary 
discipline” (Buti 2003, p. 5).  
 
Sargent and Wallace (1981) depicted a world in which a central bank that is lacking a 
dominant position vis-à-vis the Treasury department might end up facing the nasty choice 
between monetizing excessive budget deficits either today or tomorrow, that is, not being 
in control of price stability, and even in an otherwise monetarist model set-up. Their point 
was that at a certain debt ratio – with public debt being of the indexed type – the public 
might simply refuse to add government debt to their portfolios and the central bank be 
forced at that point to issue money to finance the deficit instead. A similar result for the 
case of fiscal dominance was then also obtained by the “fiscal theory of the price level” 
(Leeper 1991), in which however nominal debt plays a crucial role. Again, the central 
bank is seen as losing control over the price level, as the price level, according to this 
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chosen by the fiscal authority into the equilibrium real stock of debt they desire to hold.  
One may question Sargent and Wallace’s assumption that the interest rate payable on 
public debt necessarily exceeds the growth rate of nominal GDP (Darby 1983). More 
fundamentally, one may challenge their “monetarist” assumption that monetary policy 
would neither affect real growth nor the level of interest over the policy-relevant time-
horizon. One may similarly challenge the practical relevance of the fiscal theory of the 
price level (Buiter 2002). Finally, one may reasonably entertain some doubts as to the 
supposed impact of theoretical contributions to the actual Maastricht EMU institutional 
framework. Arguably, memories of “MEFO” loans and myths about Germany’s 
hyperinflation past may have played a greater role; given the Bundesbank’s role in the 
design of EMU also referred to in the above quotation.
31 Be that as it may, the fact 
remains that the chosen institutional set-up was intended to assure monetary dominance 
and that today any malfunctioning of the regime is quickly blamed on anything but the 
monetary institution that was granted such dominance in the policy play.  
This may be a serious mistake though, even if it seems inconceivable – from this biased 
perspective – that an independent central bank and dominant monetary player could 
possibly commit any mistakes, or even be at the root of all troubles. But before 
investigating the ECB’s actual conduct and contribution to the regime’s malfunctioning, 
some qualifications are in order here as regards the biased perspective attested above.  
                                                 
31 In referring to myths I do not wish to deny of course that Germany did experience one proper 
hyperinflation in 1922-3. It is curious though that the Great Depression and the proper deflation and 
banking crises this involved got somehow written out of Germany’s monetary history. It is also curious that 
the consequences of Hitler’s Totaler Krieg are often reduced to some supposedly monetary failing on the 
part of those who robbed some poor German savers (Tietmeyer 1991). It is clear, however, how very 
convenient all this was for the institution that could stylize itself as the rightful guardian against yet another 
hyperinflation. It is worthwhile to recall here the wisdom of Wilhelm Vocke, the first President of the 
Board of the Bank deutscher Länder, who asserted that “jede Inflation …[beginne] bei den Staatfinanzen in 
einer Aufblähung der öffentlichen Ausgaben”. (Cf. Vocke 1973). Celasun, Gelos and Prati (2004) 
emphasize the role of fiscal expectations as potential obstacles to disinflation. However, and similar to the 
empirical relationship between money and prices that supposedly holds always and everywhere, the 
empirical evidence on Vocke’s law too is not supportive for low-inflation environments as in the euro area. 
Catao and Terrones (2005: 529) conclude: “Results spanning 107 countries over 1960-2001 show a strong 
positive association between deficits and inflation among high-inflation and developing country groups, but 
not among low-inflation advanced economies”.  
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“influenced by debate in the 1970s and 1980s”, debate and the economic mainstream 
have moved on meanwhile and escaped from the new classical nihilism of that era. As 
Lambertini and Rovelli (2004, p. 135) observe: “the main evolution in [mainstream 
thinking on monetary policy] may be synthesized as the demise of the Lucas supply 
function … the macroeconomics of temporary price rigidity [is] back in fashion … the 
renaissance of neo-Keynesian macroeconomics”.  
Perhaps related to the belated recognition of the fact that real world central bank do not 
control some “money supply” (as depicted in older textbooks), but conduct interest rate 
policies instead, the mainstream has come to realize that central banks are inevitably in 
the business of active demand management. Decades of research and evidence on the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy are too hard to deny. And given the age-old 
Wicksellian insight – and paramount monetarist concern! – that interest rates cannot be 
fixed at some given level forever since this would result in price-level indeterminacy, it is 
clear that central banks have to react to developments in the economy and adjust interest 
rates in a timely and well-measured way, so as to have a stabilizing rather than de-
stabilizing effect on the economy. Allsopp and Vines (2000, p. 1) referred to “the 
emerging consensus about the ‘reaction function’ approach to macroeconomic policy.” 
Today, it is conventional wisdom that apart from controlling inflation central banks have 
another key function to fulfill, namely to stabilize output at its potential. And in this 
regard, today’s conventional wisdom also holds that of the two macroeconomic tools 
available monetary policy is the more effective stabilization instrument; since 
discretionary fiscal policies are too hard to implement and should thus in general foresee 
no more than the free operation of automatic stabilizers (Taylor 2000).  
Another qualification is that the “theory of optimum currency areas” (Mundell 1961, 
McKinnon 1963, Kenen 1969) has never really lost any of its prominence with respect to 
the EMU debate, not even in the 1970s or 1980s. And the spirit of this theory too is that 
macroeconomic policies play a paramount role as stabilization instruments. The 
important distinction drawn by this theory is between symmetric versus asymmetric 
shocks. The former pose no threat to a monetary union as long as the policy regime 
allows an appropriate common policy reaction. The latter pose no threat to the survival of 
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policy reactions.  
In view of the design of Maastricht-style EMU, it was clear beforehand that fiscal 
policies represent the member states’ sole remaining instrument to cope with asymmetric 
shocks. Just as it was understood that monetary (and exchange rate) policies do not allow 
any response to idiosyncratic shocks, but provide the key common tool to counter 
common shocks. Given the lack of coordination of national fiscal policies the euro area’s 
aggregate fiscal stance is essentially a random outcome.
32 In case of a common shock, the 
free operation of automatic stabilizers was the best to be expected. Furthermore, it may 
be debatable to what extent “flexible” versus “rigid” market structures either support or 
complicate the use of macroeconomic stabilization policies. But textbook fictions of 
instantaneous market-clearing are no guide here. For even the supposedly “flexible” US 
economy appears to need steering from – remarkably flexible! – macroeconomic policies.  
The point at issue here is that there had never been any doubt about the fact that in case 
of a common shock, say a negative demand shock hitting the euro area (even if one 
country more than another), there was essentially only one tool available: monetary 
policy. Presumably, this is what Horst Koehler, as IMF Chairman, meant when he 
reminded the ECB that “monetary policy was the first line of defense”. It is one thing that 
Mr Koehler played a prominent role in the design of Maastricht-style EMU (Dyson and 
Featherstone 1999). It is quite another that Wim Duisenberg’s response was “that he had 
never heard of that” (WSJE 9 October 2002).  
There is no reason to doubt that the late Wim Duisenberg represented the internal 
thinking at the ECB’s top accurately, on this as on other occasions. The point is that 
                                                 
32 Interestingly, ECB Executive Board member Lorenzo Bini Smaghi (2005) has recently admitted just that 
when he observed that: “There is hardly any room for euro area governments to take common budget 
policy initiatives, even if they wanted to do so, in particular in reaction to common shocks. The assessment 
of the overall euro area budgetary stance can only be made ex post, with substantial lags, and with little 
value for the policy dialogue.” It was known to everyone that at least as long as “safe” fiscal positions were 
not attained the ECB would not be in what Onorante (2004: 157) regards as the “best environment” for the 
ECB to operate in, an environment in which “fiscal policy stabilizes national output and unemployment 
while the central bank takes care of the common price stability”. Suffice to mention that in a natural rate 
context taking care of common price stability includes taking care of common economic stability (Alesina 
et al 2001, Allsopp and Artis 2003).   
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alien to the key personnel framing the ECB’s own thinking of its role, which is haunted 
by memories of supposed “straw fires” ignited by demand management. Explicitly 
questioned on the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies in a situation where 
discretionary fiscal tightening enforced by the SGP might risk further destabilization of 
euro area economies, Mr Duisenberg responded in the following remarkable way: “I 
refuse to think in terms of there being a trade-off between certain fiscal policies and the 
monetary policy stance. The monetary policy stance is determined by our monetary 
policy strategy, which is forward-looking and has a medium-term horizon. I am not 
thinking in terms of compensating by one policy events that happen in the other, in 
particular when they are of a structural nature” (Monetary Dialogue 3 December 2002). 
When it was then explained to him that the demand impact of fiscal policy would imply a 
monetary policy reaction even within that strategy Mr Duisenberg revealed that: “I 
believe my models suggest that the impact on real output would be very limited indeed” 
(Monetary Dialogue 3 December 2002).  
Observers trained in today’s mainstream theory will be baffled by such observations and 
wonder how the ECB might conceive of its interest rate policies as representing anything 
else but demand management. Certainly it is not possible to make sense of the ECB’s 
observations on fiscal policy in terms of the “German view”
33 that fiscal contractions 
would be expansionary. For in that case the allegedly too loose fiscal policies in 2000 
should have prompted interest rate cuts rather than hikes, namely to counter their 
contractionary impact – when they clearly did not. The ECB appears to hold the view that 
expansionary fiscal policies are expansionary while contractionary ones are expansionary 
too.
34 Notice that this view would justify both interest rate hikes in response to 
expansionary fiscal policies as well as a refusal to cut in response to fiscal contraction.  
                                                 
33 The GCEE propagated this view in the early 1980s but the international response to the “German view” 
was at first rather lukewarm (cf. Bibow 2004b) – until certain small-country tales seemed to prove the case 
(Giavazzi and Pagano 1990).  
34 For instance, the ECB’s Annual Report 2000 reads: “the expansionary fiscal policies planned for this 
year [2001] in a number of euro area countries are not conducive to containing aggregate demand and 
inflationary pressures. Particularly in the countries experiencing high economic growth rates, inflationary 
pressures will receive an additional stimulus from expansionary fiscal policies” (p. 47). A little later the 
ECB then declared that: “Credible fiscal consolidation is supportive to the outlook for economic growth. 
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by now become legendary for its “steady hand” and “wait and see” approach, at least 
when it comes to policy easing. By contrast, the bank nearly doubled policy rates within 
less than a year when it hiked rates by 225 basis points between November 1999 and 
October 2000. It then stubbornly resisted external pressures from all round to provide a 
timely boost to domestic demand in the world’s second largest economic area.  
Conspicuously contrasting with the U.S. Fed’s fast-track easing since early 2001, this 
conflicted with the requirement to act as the “first line of defense”; as was pointed out by 
Mr Koehler at the time. 
Before embarking on a detailed analysis of the consequences of the ECB’s failure to 
fulfill this vital role, one popular defense of the bank’s conduct needs to be addressed: the 
idea that the ECB’s complacent attitude towards plunging and subsequently stagnating 
domestic demand may have been justified in view of too high inflation. For instance, the 
OECD (2005) in its latest survey of the Euro area observed that: “in the recent downturn 
inflation has failed to come down decisively, and this has limited the scope for monetary 
policy to support economic activity in the short run” (see also Cournede et al 2005). The 
ECB itself too has constantly used this excuse to justify its “wait and see” approach to 
easing. The bank appears to interpret the “without prejudice” stipulation in its mandate as 
implying that it is not under any obligation to care about anything but its primary price 
stability goal until inflation falls “below two percent”.
35  
Of course it cannot be denied that the ECB is on track to fail on its price stability goal of 
keeping HICP inflation “below two percent” for six years in a row. Damaging effects on 
the bank’s credibility and reputation thus cannot be excluded. The point is that the ECB’s 
refusal of any responsibility for output stabilization and economic growth may have been 
counterproductive even regarding its primary mandate of maintaining price stability. And 
this issue is closely related to the question which price index the ECB should focus on in 
the first place.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Direct effects on demand in the short term should be counteracted by higher credibility of the conduct of 
fiscal policy, boosting confidence and thus private spending” (ECB 2002, Monthly Bulletin October, p. 6).   
35 The ECB’s mantra that by maintaining price stability monetary policy would thereby also make the best 
possible contribution to any other goal would seem to imply that by failing on its price stability goal the 
ECB thereby also made a sub-optimal contribution to anything else.  
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monetary policy strategy for the ESCB” appeared, it has been heavily criticized by both 
academics as well as practitioners for its chosen definition of price stability. One 
criticism is that it may be too ambitious. Another that the conspicuous lack of an explicit 
lower bound reflects an asymmetric policy approach, a criticism that was only partly met 
by the strategy reform of May 2003, when the ECB “clarified” that it aims at keeping 
HICP inflation “below but close to two percent”. A further key issue is whether it would 
not be more appropriate to focus policy on “core” rather than “headline” inflation.  
And it is important here that focusing on headline inflation “over the medium term”, as 
the ECB apparently does in some unspecified way, is not the same as explicitly putting 
core inflation center stage of monetary policy. The IMF (2005, p. 18) acknowledged that 
the persistent over-shooting of the ECB’s headline inflation ceiling presents a credibility 
problem to the bank. And the OECD (2004, p. 39) had diagnosed earlier on a “dilemma 
for monetary policy: on the one hand monetary policy should take out insurance against 
the risk of longer-lasting stagnation, but on the other hand the ECB may feel 
uncomfortable with a further easing of monetary policy in an environment of inflation 
inertia”, headline inflation inertia, that is! The hypothesis investigated in what follows is 
that focusing policy on headline inflation may have contributed to seriously misleading 
monetary policy.  
The transmission of monetary policy to the economy works largely through aggregate 
demand in the short run. Core inflation measures are designed to gauge underlying 
inflation trends as reflecting aggregate demand conditions in the economy. It could easily 
lead to mistakes if policy responded to “noise” (purely temporary disturbances) instead. 
Moreover, given that headline inflation tends to converge back towards the underlying 
rate (OECD 2005), core inflation serves as a predictor of future headline inflation too, 
and thus provides a handy tool for any forward-looking policy approach.  
Inflation targeting is one such approach and today widely regarded as best practice or 
state-of-the-art monetary policy. Nessen and Söderström (2000) proposed an extension of 
Svensson’s (1997) basic model of inflation (forecast) targeting which is of much interest 
here. For the purpose of investigating the implications of targeting different measures of 
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inflation disturbances, e.g. changes in imported inflation, which cannot be affected by 
monetary policy, (ii) movements in inflation originating in fiscal policy actions, i.e. 
changes in indirect taxes and subsidies, and (iii) the direct effects of monetary policy on 
headline inflation via home-mortgage costs. In practice, this measure of core inflation 
corresponds to the Sveriges Riksbank’s UNDINHX index, which is most closely related 
to the level of real activity in the economy and can be affected by monetary policy.  
In an optimizing model in which the central bank attempts to minimize a standard loss 
function, they investigate the policy responses across targeting regimes. As regards to 
fiscal policy disturbances with persistent effects on inflation, they find that the central 
bank’s response depends on whether it targets core or headline inflation, the latter either 
in a strict or flexible way. Under strict headline inflation targeting monetary policy would 
respond to fiscal policy disturbances by changing the interest rate in the same direction. 
By contrast, under core inflation targeting (and to a lesser extent under flexible headline 
inflation targeting) the optimal response is to lower the interest rate after a positive 
disturbance. This is to offset the effects on output and thus on future inflation. One of 
their key policy implications regarding properly accounting for the indirect effects of 
persistent disturbances on goal variables reads: “In our model, although the direct effects 
of an indirect tax increase is to raise inflation, the indirect effects on inflation via 
depressed output dominate the direct effect in the longer run. Thus, the central bank 
should lower the interest rate following a fiscal policy disturbance, even though the initial 
effect on inflation is positive” (Nessen and Söderström 2000, p. 21). Note here the crucial 
assumptions that a fiscal tightening affects aggregate demand negatively and that the 
resulting negative output gap exerts a dampening effect on future inflation too. These 
assumptions are crucial but not special. They are part of today’s conventional wisdom. In 
view of the inflation persistence theme the question is whether the latter assumption may 
not be true for the euro area.  
Now it may be argued here that the ECB is not an inflation targeter. But that is exactly 
the point. Contrary to a widespread suggestion, the ECB does not seem to conduct 
monetary policy along standard inflation targeting lines (Bibow 2005b). It is of course 
possible that the ECB model really assumes that fiscal contractions have expansionary 
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assumes that a negative output gap does not put any downward pressure on inflation, or 
that contrary to what is assumed above concerning indirect effects on inflation via 
depressed output, second-round effects owing to wage responses to headline inflation 
deserve more emphasis. Given the well-known lack of transparency in these matters, we 
simply do not know.  
Any properly forward-looking monetary policy has to discount the effects of fiscal policy 
on the economy and future inflation in some way though. Just as monetary policy has to 
take its own effects on the economy and the budgetary position – as well as fiscal policy 
decisions prompted by those developments! – into account too, that is, fully internalize 
the fiscal regime in place.  
Mankiw and Reis (2002) offer a more general approach to the problem at hand: which 
measure of the inflation rate should a central bank committed to maintaining price 
stability use if it wants to maximize economic stability? They set out to find “the price 
index that, if kept on an assigned target, would lead to the greatest stability in economic 
activity. This concept might be called the stability price index” (Mankiw and Reis 2002, 
p. 7). In their view, the proposed price index “can be viewed as an approach to measuring 
core inflation that is grounded in the monetary theory of the business cycle” (p. 26).  
Nothing in their analysis hinges on the central bank at hand following an explicit inflation 
targeting approach. Rather “the central bank is committed to inflation targeting in the 
following sense: Before the shocks are realized, the central bank must choose a price 
index and commit itself to keeping that index on target” (p. 7). The issue simply is: which 
price index? Clearly, it is not an outrageous requirement that the central bank should aim 
at maintaining price stability in such a way that this leads to the greatest stability in 
economic activity too. In fact, this very proposition features rather prominently among 
the ECB’s standard claims about the supposed qualities of its “stability-oriented” 
monetary policies.  
In a nutshell, Mankiw and Reis (2002) conclude that: the weight that a sector’s price 
should receive in the stability price index depends positively on that sector’s 
responsiveness to the business cycle and negatively on the magnitude of idiosyncratic 
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less weight it should receive in the stability price index. Applying their model to the U.S. 
economy over the period from 1957 to 2001, they find that “a central bank should give 
substantial weight to the growth in nominal wages when monitoring inflation. This 
conclusion follows from the fact that wages are more cyclically sensitive than most other 
prices in the economy (which is another way of stating the well-known fact that the real 
wage is procyclical). Moreover, compared to other cyclically sensitive prices, wages are 
not subject to large idiosyncratic shocks” (Mankiw and Reis 2002, p. 26).  
For our purposes one issue here is that wages may be less cyclically responsive and 
overall less flexible in the euro area – given those much-blamed “rigidities”. Another 
issue is how fiscal policy disturbances (hikes in indirect taxes and administered prices, 
for instance) should be treated following the logic of this approach. Arguably, they 
should be seen as highly idiosyncratic shocks and thus receive little weight in a stability 
price index (cf. Pollan 2004, p. 897, fn 13). This would be perfectly in line with the view 
that monetary policy should focus on a measure of core inflation that excludes “tax-push” 
together with other volatile items like food and energy.
36  
Intriguingly, there is however also the possibility that tax-push effects might become 
cyclical rather than idiosyncratic, namely if the fiscal regime is such that tax-push 
measures are systematically prompted as the budgetary position deteriorates sufficiently. 
Notice that this would exactly describe the case where a policy response to headline 
rather than core inflation both ignites the phenomenon of tax-push inflation in the first 
place and at the same time lends suboptimal support to economic stability too; with the 
possibility of a vicious circle of economic instability giving rise to budgetary pressures 
which, in turn, cause and sustain tax-push inflation.  
These thoughtful theoretical contributions thus reveal how tax-push inflation might 
emerge as an unpleasant symptom of the counterproductive interaction between monetary 
                                                 
36 Wynne (1999) seems to question the wisdom of excluding the effects of tax changes from inflation 
measures when the object is to derive a true cost of living index. While that may well be the case, the issue 
here is whether an inflation measure net of tax push may provide better guidance to monetary policy, 
especially under Maastricht-style EMU conditions. Cf. Johnson 1999.   
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persistence in headline inflation, that is.  
In conclusion, according to today’s conventional wisdom and mainstream monetary 
theory, monetary policy is the leading stabilization instrument quite apart from its role in 
maintaining price stability. Moreover the design of Maastricht-style EMU clearly implies 
that monetary policy has to bear the main burden of countering common shocks hitting 
the euro area and act as the “first line of defense”, as one of the regime’s designers (Horst 
Koehler) once put it.  
If it is argued, then, that the ECB either could not play this role “without prejudice” to 
price stability because headline inflation exceeded two per cent since 2000 and/or that the 
ECB always and automatically makes its best contribution to output stabilization and 
growth anyway, namely through maintaining price stability, a paramount concern is 
whether the ECB actually focuses on the right measure of price stability. Theory not only 
suggests that any forward-looking monetary policy has to properly internalize the fiscal 
regime. It also warns that focusing on headline inflation risks policy mistakes when fiscal 
policy disturbances to price developments arise. The fact is that the euro area has seen 
whole series of fiscal policy disturbances to price developments in recent years that 
deserve the title tax-push inflation and played a key role behind the apparent inflation 
persistence despite rising cyclical slack.  
The next section will give a consistent account of occurrences since 1999 that shows how 
the ECB’s failure to act as the first line of defense and misguided policy focus on 
headline inflation have caused, apart from economic instability and protracted stagnation, 
tax-push inflation and inflation persistence too. Focusing on the wrong measure of 
inflation can be very misleading and produce economic instability. The apparent 
persistence in inflation that has fostered the notorious one-sided focus on structural 
rigidities in policy debates masks the fact that underlying inflation in much of the euro 
area has fallen to dangerously low levels today. Succumbing to protracted stagnation, 
underlying inflation has meanwhile fallen to little more than one percent in the euro area 
and to zero in Germany.  
 
  667. The ECB and the genesis of tax-push inflation  
Building on the above results, this section sets out to provide a full account of the ECB’s 
paramount role behind the peculiar kind of “stagflation” that has arisen in the euro area in 
recent years. Many observers were puzzled by the fact that despite years of stagnation 
inflation – apparently – has declined so little. The point is that headline inflation has 
failed to decline faster exactly because of stagnation; while core inflation developments 
tell a different story and further underline the fateful impact of the ECB’s profound 
policy mistakes.
37  
Figure 34. Inflation developments in EMU
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phase 3: core inflation responds to stagnation, 
but energy prices and tax push keep headline 
inflation up
 
It may be appropriate to focus on inflation developments – the ECB’s declared “sole” 
goal.
38 For that purpose Figure 34 divides price developments from 1999 until today into 
                                                 
37 Notice that the hypothesis put forward here focuses on mistakes in policy conduct, without however 
wishing to deny that the euro area’s monetary structure, the kind of independence the ECB enjoys, is 
thoroughly flawed. The suggested link between structure and conduct is that the ECB’s kind of 
independence features incentive structures that make an anti-growth bias more likely while allowing central 
bankers to get away with almost anything (cf. Bibow 2004a, d, 2005b). Suffice to mention here that an 
answer to the “persistence puzzle” may also be sought along time-inconsistency lines, suggesting yet 
another link between monetary structure and conduct that allegedly can give rise to an inflationary bias (cf. 
Westelius 2005).    
38 The investigation here refrains from providing yet another Taylor-rule exercise. The point is that by 
means of such exercises almost anything may be “proven”. It is always possible to find some parameter set 
that shows the ECB has done a great job. Examples of that kind are abundantly available. Apart from 
investment banks and prominent academic ECB watchers like London’s Centre for Economic Policy 
Research (see CEPR 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004), the European Commission too has provided some 
particularly illustrative examples. For instance, in its 2001 Annual Report the Commission still observed 
  67three phases, largely corresponding to the ECB’s three key policy blunders. Phase 1 
lasted until 2001:Q1. Despite the Asian and Russian crises, sufficiently strong domestic 
demand growth kept GDP growth slightly above the postulated trend in 1998-1999, while 
the net exports contribution to GDP then boosted growth further in 2000. Core inflation 
in this phase was very low (below 1.5 percent) and, if anything, declining. By contrast, 
headline inflation soared sharply after mid 2000. Rising oil prices were one key factor. 
Another was the plunging euro, driving import prices generally higher and magnifying 
the oil price boom in particular.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
that: “In 2000, short-term interest rates were clearly above the level suggested by the Taylor rule” (p. 57). 
But the Commission’s fitted Taylor rule of two years later then saw to it that the ECB barely approached 
neutral territory from below in the second half of 2000 and stayed well below the neutral level thereafter 
too, so that it seemed legitimate to conclude that monetary policy was “accommodative to economic 
activity during the slowdown” (European Commission 2003, p. 31). Minford, Perugini and Srinivasan 
(2002) show that Taylor-rule like interest rate relations do not unambiguously identify a central bank 
reaction function. Kuttner and Posen (2004) more specifically discuss some problems with Taylor rules in 
policy environments characterized by stagnation and very low inflation (or deflation like in Japan). 
Looking at US monetary history through the lens of a Taylor-rule framework for policy analysis 
Orphanides (2003) finds that it generally allows a surprising consistency in interpretation while its adoption 
does not seem “sufficient to ensure that monetary policy will stay a steady course” (p. 1018). Cecchetti and 
O’Sullivan (2003, p. 39-40) observe on Taylor-rule performance evaluations: “The question is whether it is 
possible actually to evaluate policy using such exercises. If the rule had been followed at the beginning of 
the period, then inflation and growth would have been different later. This is obvious, and what it means is 
that you cannot look at the actual policy relative to a Taylor-style rule without embedding the rule in a fully 
articulated dynamic structural model of the euro area.” Bibow (2004d) debunks some typical ECB-serving 
Taylor-rule exercises, stressing that the ECB’s ill-guided hikes in 2000, apart from crushing the economy, 
also crashed the euro and pushed inflation up, which, according to Taylor-rule wisdom, thereby produced 
the very rationale for having raised interest rates to such abortive levels in the first place.  
  68Given that the “time-inconsistency hypothesis” of the euro’s plunge (see Bibow 2001a, 
2002), featuring both the ECB’s confusing communications as well as its euro-weakening 
interest rate hikes, is all too inconvenient to gain much popularity, other authorities may 
be cited instead. For instance, in its 2000 review of the EU economy, the European 
Commission vigilantly observed: ‘To the extent that the depreciation in the euro is due to 
cyclical divergence between the euro area and the United States, a rise in interest rates in 
an attempt to support the currency could even backfire if it was perceived as stifling the 
euro-area recovery. The risk of creating an even more unbalanced growth pattern with 
weak domestic demand and higher export growth would be serious’ (EC 2000: 71). No 
more is required, then, to take this authority’s reading seriously and add two plus two 
together to acknowledge that Box 1 offers a coherent account of the impact of the ECB’s 
tightening binge of 2000. Notice that the ECB managed to push inflation up while 
choking domestic demand through its aggressive hikes.
39 The fact that headline HICP 
inflation has stubbornly stayed above two percent ever since is what then gave rise to the 
inflation persistence theme.  
Of no less interest is the sharp rise in core inflation to above two percent in 2001-2002, 
the key feature of phase 2. This was the time when GDP growth, especially domestic 
demand, slumped; following the ECB’s earlier sharp tightening with the usual lag. Does 
this support the idea that inflation in the euro area is not responsive to the economy, or 
may even respond perversely?
40 Given the well-known fact that productivity growth 
tends to be cyclical it is actually not much of a surprise at all that the immediate impact of 
a slowdown on prices is in the upward direction. The OECD’s (2004, p. 32) observation 
on occurrences in the Netherlands applies to the euro area more generally too: “High 
growth in unit labour costs (together with depreciation of the euro), also contributed to an 
                                                 
39 I use interest rates here as shorthand for the whole transmission mechanism of monetary policy rather 
than the interest-rate channel alone; the effectiveness of which some researchers seem to doubt. The ECB’s 
(2002) research on the transmission mechanism has revealed a strong impact of interest rates on domestic 
demand, primarily investment.   
40 The OECD (2004: 40) commented: “Apparently the adverse price shocks in 2000 and 2001 were partly 
built into wage demands. While labour productivity growth slowed down with the onset of the economic 
downturn, nominal compensation rates edged up. Inflation persistence has been stronger in the euro area 
than in other countries, although the initial shocks to food and energy prices were also larger as they were 
amplified by the depreciation of the currency in the first two years of the monetary union.” Perhaps one 
should be impressed by how little wage inflation edged up despite strong growth in 2000 and a sharp rise in 
headline inflation (not least due to the euro’s plunge, as the OECD correctly notes).  
  69increase in core inflation”. Importantly, it is not good enough to blame the predictable 
productivity slowdown on either unions or structural rigidities. The ECB knew what it 
was in for when it provoked the slump. Is excessive wage inflation or lack of cyclical 
responsiveness of wages to blame then?  
Figure 35. Barking up against the wrong tree
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Figure 35 clearly shows that wage inflation as measured by the “negotiated wages” index 
had declined to a rather low level by the late 1990s, very low indeed and by any standard. 
It has remained conspicuously stable at that low level ever since. It may well be true that 
wages in the euro area are less responsive to the cycle than in the U.S. or U.K., for 
instance. Crucially, though, this holds in both directions. Taking wage drift into account, 
the acceleration in wage growth in 1999-2000 becomes somewhat more noticeable. But 
so does the fact that wage growth has declined to even lower levels in recent years of 
stagnation. If wage inflation in the U.S. fell more sharply after 2001, this was because 
wage inflation had accelerated far more sharply in preceding years and thus had 
sufficiently more room to decelerate later on.
41  
There are some important monetary policy implications here. But there is certainly no 
case here for blaming inflation persistence on too high wage inflation. Seen from the 
perspective of Mankiw and Reis’s (2002) analysis, wage inflation may be a good gauge 
                                                 
41 It is curious that certain prominent authorities pushing the structural reform agenda should notoriously 
overlook this rather vital fact (see OECD 2005 and Cournede et al. 2005, for instance).  
  70of underlying demand pressures in the euro area too and thus deserve a high weight in a 
stability price index. Similarly, other researchers concluded that in case of very low 
inflation as in the euro area it may be necessary to give more weight to real signals of 
economic activity rather than supposedly cyclical prices. In fact, the CEPR 2002 Report 
warned that failing to do so may be risky too: “The ECB would be well advised to give 
more importance to indicators of the real economy. The theory that all you have to do to 
stabilize the economy is to stabilize the rate of inflation may be a good approximation 
when inflation is not too low. It becomes dangerous when inflation is near zero” (CEPR 
2002, p. 18).   
Due to a further deceleration in wage inflation and a (partial) recovery in productivity 
growth, core inflation has fallen markedly since its temporary slump-induced acceleration 
in 2001-2002. In fact, core inflation has fallen back again to the very low levels of 1998-
1999. It is currently little more than one percent for the euro area as a whole. And in 
some regions it is even closer to zero. The key feature of this third phase is the 
conspicuous gap between headline and core inflation that has opened up since 2002. 
Soaring energy and commodity prices, partly compensated by the euro’s appreciation, 
were one key driving force behind this gap. Tax-push inflation has been the other – as the 
empirical investigations in sections 4 and 5 above amply showed.  









1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Source. ECB, Eurostat (August 2005) 
Note. The ECB proxy measure estimates the direct price effects of tax increases on tobacco products and of a narrow range of administered 


































  71In effect, rises in indirect taxes and administered prices, largely reflecting finance 
ministers’ desperate but vain attempts at keeping budget deficits below 3 percent, led to 
an upward distortion that has kept headline inflation stubbornly above the ECB’s 
tolerance level. Contributing roughly 0.5 percentage point to headline inflation in 2004 
overall, the tax-push contribution peaked at no less that 0.7 percent by the end of 2004. It 
then declined in early 2005 but for the year as a whole the tax-push contribution will 
probably be little less than last year. Note, then, that without “tax-push inflation” the 
ECB would not have failed on its price stability mandate in the last five years (see Figure 
36). Among other things, tax-push inflation has also distracted attention away from the 
vital fact that measures of inflation that properly capture the aggregate demand situation 
in the euro area have not proved unresponsive to cyclical slack at all. The inflation 
persistence theme is simply missing the point.   
 
Box no. 2 summarizes the counterproductive interaction between fiscal and monetary 
policies of recent years, featuring a stability-oriented vicious circle with tax-push 
inflation as the key symptom in a macroeconomic policy blunder that has left the euro 
area stranded in stagnation – with inflation persistently above the set limit of 2 percent. It 
is hard to deny that with a more adequate monetary policy response to the symmetric 
  72shock that hit the euro area in 2000-01, which was itself at least partly monetary in 
nature, the failure of a rising number of member states to stay within the 3 percent 
budgetary threshold could have been avoided. Effectively, fiscal and monetary policies 
have prevented each other from achieving their respective primary (or sole) goals, 
deficits below 3 percent of GDP and inflation below 2 percent.  
In fact, Euroland’s two key “stability-oriented” institutions, the SGP and the ECB, have 
thereby shot each other in the foot. As the ECB reneged on its growth mandate and failed 
to properly counter the symmetric shock of 2000-01, budget deficits of more and more 
member states began to pass through the 3 percent threshold by 2002; and finance 
ministers’ desperate thrift campaigns, in turn, have then not only further destabilized 
Euroland, but kept inflation above the holy 2 percent threshold ever since, too. Given this 
highly dysfunctional interaction between monetary and fiscal policies the seemingly 
paradoxical finding that “regulated price inflation is even negatively correlated with that 
of non-regulated prices” (Lünnemann and Mathä 2005, p. 20) is quite easily explained. 
While cyclical slack depresses non-regulated prices (at least once cost pressures owing to 
the productivity slowdown abate), it also causes budgetary pressures which, in turn, tend 
to push regulated prices in the opposite direction if the stability-oriented fiscal regime 
requires consolidation no matter what (see Figure 37).   
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  738. Can structural reforms lift the euro area out of its liquidity trap? 
The above investigation of the ECB’s role in the genesis of tax-push inflation and its 
evolution in recent years also raises some more immediate monetary policy issues, 
foremost among them the question whether it is really correct to describe the level of 
interest in the euro area as “low” today. In the light of Wicksell’s (1898) fundamental 
insight, it is obviously wrong to draw any conclusions as regards monetary stance from 
the absolute level of interest. The absolute level of interest simply is no indicator of 
today’s monetary stance. Rather, today’s interest rate level may reflect the course of 
yesterday’s policy stance, as Milton Friedman (1968, p. 7) once observed: “low interest 
rates are a sign that monetary policy has been tight”. While there is no easy way to judge 
what the “natural” or equilibrium rate of interest may be at any time relative to which the 
market rate of interest could be properly assessed, it would seem crucial to exclude both 
energy price increases and tax-push inflation from any measure of real interest rates for 
the euro area. Indirect tax increases and rising oil prices are a clear drag on the private 
sectors’ purchasing power, but do not provide any relief to nominal interest payments.  
This implies that real short-term interest rates in the euro area are around one percent, 
while longer-term real rates are well above two percent; with significant diversity 
existing within the euro area. For instance, German real short-term interest rates may be 
little less than two percent and real long-term rates around three percent. It is not clear 
that these levels are “low” in any meaningful sense at all. In practice, effective nominal 
interest rates on consumer loans may be near ten percent. For someone who does not 
expect any significant rises in real disposable income in coming years but may actually 
fear to lose his job, such interest rates may appear punitively high.  
This situation may be compared with occurrences in the U.S. since 2001, where the 
Federal Reserve pushed real short-term interest rates well into negative territory in recent 
years and showed itself remarkably compliant in guiding longer-term rates to very low 
levels too, even as the largest fiscal swing in U.S. history was unfolding. In fact, there 
can be little doubt that the U.S. Fed has played a key role in pushing bond yields well 
below the rate of nominal GDP growth after 2001; even if their more recent refusal to rise 
again in line with the Fed funds rate may have presented something of a “conundrum” 
  74even to its Chairman. In essence, the euro area has missed out on both the fast-tracking 
easing and extended ultra-easy-money stance of the U.S. Fed as well as the 
unprecedented fiscal boost to domestic demand that the US economy received in 2001-
2004.  
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In the euro area, automatic stabilizers appear to have been in operation. If any additional 
stimulus had been provided, this has meanwhile been reversed; the 2005 structural 
balance (as a percent of GDP) is back to where it supposedly was in 2000. But similar to 
the case of monetary policy, figure 38 also shows that fiscal policy may actually be 
chasing its own tail too. It is curious that as countries comply with reducing their 
structural budget deficits by at least 0.5 percentage points per year no matter what, they 
continue to depress domestic demand and GDP growth sufficiently, so as to invite 
downward revisions in potential output growth as well as corresponding upward revisions 
in structural budget deficits. The result is not consolidation, but stagnation. As the debt 
ratio is set on a rising trend the burden of the debt is actually getting heavier. Therefore, 
as one symptom of persistent macroeconomic mismanagement, tax-push inflation is 
likely to continue featuring prominently in the euro area’s ongoing economic malaise and 
apparent inflation persistence.  
The IMF’s deliberations on Euro Area Policies of August 2005 are very revealing. The 
report observes that “ECB officials nonetheless saw the distribution of risks to inflation 
  75as heavily skewed to the upside. They argued that indirect taxes, administered prices, and 
oil prices, which were essentially held constant in the projections, continued to pose 
upside risks for inflation. These had been the main factors behind the repeatedly 
optimistic forecasts and five years of at least 2 percent inflation. They remained major 
risks going forward …” (IMF 2005, p. 15). It is one thing that “staff saw the risks to price 
stability as more balanced than suggested by the ECB” (p. 18).
42 It is quite another that 
we have to attest here a rather obstinate refusal to understand that the ECB’s failure to 
boost growth is the very cause that will tend to keep tax-push inflation alive and kicking.   
One cannot deny though that overlooking this vital fact is rather convenient when it 
comes to pushing for the structural reform agenda. The IMF (2005a) has recently 
acknowledged that wage restraint seems to have failed to work, but now suspects that 
product market rigidities are to blame since a lack of competition appears to have limited 
the downward pressures on product prices. It is not obvious how the shifted focus on 
goods markets can be squared with the idea that it is rising corporate profits that would 
boost investment. For keeping prices and margins up was clearly conducive to the soaring 
in corporate profits in recent years. It is the alleged link between profits and investment 
that seems to have failed. How, then, is downward pressure on product prices through 
structural reforms going to improve this outcome? Could it boost both profits and 
consumers’ purchasing at the same time? 
It could indeed, but only if falling inflation induced a monetary policy reaction that will 
boost aggregate demand sufficiently. One trouble with this view is that the ECB could 
have done it years ago, thereby forestalling stagnation and the emergence of tax-push 
inflation. But the trouble with this remedy is that the ECB has for long declared that 
nominal interest rates have by now succumbed to levels from which they cannot fall any 
further anyway. According to the ECB, cutting short-term rates would undermine 
                                                 
42 This important difference in assessment not only found its way into the IMF’s September 2005 World 
Economic Outlook but has actually widened by that time, with the ECB apparently leaning towards a 
tightening bias in view of increasing inflation risks (Bloomberg 26 September 2005) while the IMF judges 
that “overall excessive monetary tightness appears a greater risk than excessive monetary ease” (IMF 
2005b, WEO, p. 28). As usual, the ECB’s views meet no more sympathy in the markets either, as is nicely 
captured by a large German bank’s commentary featuring the headline “The fairy tale of second-round 
effects” and observing that “In fact, the opposite is true – much to the delight of bond market investors” 
(Krämer 2005). Suffice to mention that the ECB fears a bond price bubble and continues to fret about 
excess liquidity.  
  76confidence and drive up bond yields. Admittedly, it seems a curious excuse for inaction 
by the ECB to effectively admit that it has maneuvered the economy under its 
stewardship into a “liquidity trap”. For this is generally seen as the ultimate blunder a 
central bank can possibly commit. But if the ECB were right, this would imply that 
disinflation through product market reforms will not only tend to squeeze profits, the 
supposed driver of investment, but also push real interest rates up.  
The OECD is similarly off track in continuing to blindly push for structural reform of 
labour markets as the supposed panacea of all troubles. Ignoring the fact that wage 
inflation is extremely low already, the OECD (2005, italics added) recently argued:  
“There is also evidence of higher wage inertia in the euro area than in other 
economies, which may be due to high minimum wages, administrative extensions 
of wage agreements, catch up clauses in collective agreements and de facto 
indexation of wages. These sources of rigidity should be removed, not only to lift 
potential growth, but also to provide more leeway for pursuing an effective 
monetary policy, and strengthen the area’s resilience to adverse shocks.” 
Clearly, at the current juncture, such a course would not provide any more or less leeway 
for pursuing an effective monetary policy if the ECB were right that nominal rates cannot 
decline further. (And if the ECB were wrong one might wonder here whether it refuses to 
cut, so that the OECD can call a little louder for structural reform as the supposed sole 
remedy.) But it is also not clear that this would strengthen the area’s resilience to adverse 
shocks. With core inflation running at one percent should it not be considered that adding 
still further disinflationary forces might actually weaken the area’s resilience and make it 
more likely for it to actually drift into outright deflation?  
Be that as it may, the possibility of strong enough external shocks that could drag the 
euro area out of its policy-inflicted vicious circle excluded, we are likely to witness the 
continued unfolding of the phenomenon of tax-push inflation in future too – as a 
symptom of the counterproductive interaction between fiscal and monetary policies under 
the Maastricht regime. The next section introduces a model of the interaction of fiscal 
and monetary policies under Maastricht-style EMU conditions, allowing the simulation 
of tax-push inflation.  
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9. Simulating tax-push inflation 
The model introduced in this section is designed to simulate the interaction between 
fiscal and monetary policies under the Maastricht regime. The model is in the spirit of 
Sargent and Wallace (1981), only that it provides a Keynesian version of how tighter 
money today can mean higher inflation today.  
It is of course somewhat ironic that the very wisdom that seems to justify, and may even 
have inspired, the Maastricht regime has turned out to produce such thoroughly perverse 
results: “stability-oriented” monetary policy protected by “sound public finance” 
safeguards resulted in both excessive deficits as well as “excessive” inflation (headline 
inflation in excess of two percent, that is). This is truly turning Sargent and Walace’s 
supposedly monetarist world upside down.  
From a Keynesian perspective this outcome is not all that surprising though: too 
restrictive macroeconomic policies are prone to result in stagnant aggregate demand, 
which is bound to provoke budgetary pressures, which, in turn, may easily induce 
inflationary tax measures if budgetary rules dictate that consolidation attempts are to be 
undertaken no matter what.  
Departing from Sargent and Wallace’s monetarist vision, the model introduced here is 
Keynesian in the sense that the modeled central bank conducts interest rate policies rather 
than controlling some money stock that is partly financing the budget deficit.
43 It is also 
Keynesian in acknowledging that interest rate policies not only affect prices, but real 
growth and the level of interest in the economy too. Even if the money-neutrality 
postulate were believed as far as the long run is concerned, the relevant period since 2000 
                                                 
43 Of course this is not to deny that central bank profits may ease budgetary pressures if independent central 
bankers dare to act accordingly. Except for two occasions of rather limited volume the ECB refused to put 
its exorbitant US dollar reserves to good use in 2000; which would have provided welcome budgetary relief 
and ammunition in the incipient downturn too. Ironically, dollar depreciation since then meant that the ECB 
even incurred a sizeable loss in 2004. In addition, the ECB is catching up with general belt-tightening 
efforts elsewhere as extracting revenues from a severely depressed economy that is struggling under 
“historically extremely low” interest rates is getting ever harder too.  
  78under investigation here would still seem short enough to justify these alternative 
Keynesian assumptions. The following describes the basic structure of the model used in 
the simulation exercise.  
Suppose an annual real GDP trend growth rate, y
r^, of three percent. Suppose further that 
GDP growth is affected negatively by the central bank’s interest rate instrument, and may 
be hit by shocks too. This is expressed in equation (1).  
(1)    ^. 0 3 * (. 0 5 )
r ya i =− − + s h
(2)  (/ ) * ( 1 ) * ( 1 ) ph w prod tindr τ =+ +  
Equation (2) describes how the level of headline prices is determined in this Keynesian 
model economy. The part that features unit-labor costs multiplied by a (fixed) profit 
mark-up is standard, and yields the core price level. But equation (2) also features the 
indirect tax rate, tindr, which brings out the key element in the model. Since the depicted 
economy is a single-good economy, the price index is in the nature of a GDP deflator. 
More specifically, multiplying the core price level with real output yields GDP at factor 
costs, while using headline prices instead yields GDP at market prices. Yet, it does not 
stretch imagination too much to interpret the play of the indirect tax rate in this model, 
which, when triggered, drives a wedge between core and headline prices, as impacting on 
a consumer price index like HICP in a similar way.   
So what moves the indirect tax rate then? It is the Maastricht fiscal regime that prompts 
hikes in indirect taxes whenever the three percent deficit ceiling is hit. In practice, 
governments may of course allow deficits to overrun three percent of GDP in the short 
run; just as they may start to implement consolidation measures before the three percent 
ceiling is actually broken. Furthermore, governments can also cut investment spending or 
fire public sector workers, for instance, and in practice they are likely to use some 
mixture of all possible alternatives open to them. By contrast, the government in this 
model economy acts only when the limit is triggered and it also uses one kind of measure 
only to keep the deficit below three percent of GDP at all times: hikes in indirect taxes. 
Our stricter interpretation of the Maastricht regime and focus on one available option 
serves to illustrate the key issue: tax-push inflation. 
  79In other respects the modeling of the government budget constraint is fairly conventional. 
Tax revenues include direct and indirect taxes while nominal government expenditures 
grow at a steady five percent rate and the interest service on the public debt is trailing the 
monetary policy stance (through a twelve-period moving average). Direct tax revenues 
are a simple linear function of nominal GDP, the direct tax rate being fixed. The 
expression for indirect tax revenues is slightly more intricate as the indirect tax rate is a 
quadratic function of GDP, reflecting the model specification of the indirect tax rate as 
the key endogenous variable capturing all the budget adjustment in case the three percent 
ceiling is hit.  
(3)    * bd g t r gd =− +
(4)    ( 1)*1.05 gg =−
(5)    12() rM A i =
(6)    * tdir tdirr y =
(7)    */ ( 1 ) tind tindr y tindr =+
Note that the five percent growth rate of government spending corresponds to the steady-
state nominal GDP growth rate of this model economy. In fact, the model’s steady-state 
solution neatly corresponds to the famous Maastricht parameters: three percent deficit 
ratio, 60 percent debt ratio, and five percent nominal GDP growth rate. With a “neutral” 
nominal interest rate of five percent, the steady-state primary budget is balanced. And 
given the assumption of a three percent real GDP growth trend, the central bank in this 
model economy considers (just below) two percent annual inflation as tolerable – as is 
the case in steady state. Furthermore, in steady state the indirect tax rate is zero, core and 
headline prices are equal, as are core and headline inflation rates at (just below) two 
percent. And with wage inflation and productivity growth at five and three percent, 
respectively, unit-labor costs rise at the rate of price inflation too.  
While steady-state wage inflation corresponds to the nominal GDP growth rate of five 
percent, wages are responsive to both the output (growth) gap (although unemployment is 
  80not modeled explicitly) and inflation. The same holds for the central bank too. Equations 
(8) and (9) describe the wage and interest rate dynamics in the model.  
(8)    (1 ) (2 ) (1 ) ^ 1 2*( ^ .0194) 3*( ^ .03) 4* 2* w b b ph b yk b b pgap −− =+ − + − − −
− (9)    (1 ) (2 ) (1 ) 1 2*( ^ .0194) 3*( ^ .03) 4* 2* i c c ph c yk c c pgap −− =+ − + − −
Coefficients  b1 and c1 describe the steady state rate of wage inflation and level of 
interest. Coefficients b2 and c2 capture the response of wages and monetary policy to 
deviations from the “tolerable” steady state headline inflation rate of (just below) two 
percent (1.94%). Coefficients b3 and c3 capture the response to the output gap (ygap), 
which is measured as a proportion of the level of potential output, with potential output 
growth following a simple four-period moving average of actual output growth.  
So notice that the monetary policy reaction function is of the conventional Taylor-rule 
type. The key issue is to what extent the response of either wages and/or monetary policy 
to headline inflation may be dampened, that is, to what extent core inflation may act as 
the principal guideline instead (with pgap standing for the difference between headline 
and core inflation rates). In particular, a value of 1 for c4 implies that the central bank 
effectively responds to deviations of core inflation from the tolerable inflation rate, but 
completely ignores headline inflation. 
The perfect fit of the model’s steady state solution with the Maastricht parameters is one 
attractive feature. But the key issue is that the model allows simulating the interaction of 
monetary and fiscal policies under Maastricht rules when shocks hit the model economy. 
Two types of shock simulations were carried out. In the first case a stochastic shock 
drives the economy away from its three percent real GDP trend (five percent nominal 
GDP). In case of a negative shock budgetary pressures arise that trigger increases in 
indirect taxes. Monetary policy responds in Taylor-rule fashion to stabilize output and 
inflation – the issue being whether it should respond to core rather than headline 
inflation. The second type of shocks is of the systematically negative type, persistently 
depressing demand and output growth and provoking correspondingly persistent 
budgetary pressures. Again, the issue is whether monetary policy should respond to core 
or headline inflation.   
  81Starting with the first, the stochastic-shock exercise, model simulations unambiguously 
show that focusing on core inflation is advisable. Inflation volatility (both core and 
headline) declines continuously as policy focus moves away from headline toward core 
inflation. Tax-push inflation plays less of a role in this case, and the move has beneficial 
effects on output too (at least for values of c4 not too close to 1).  
But of more direct relevance is the case of persistent negative demand shocks. Model 
simulations confirm the previous result: the monetary authorities are better off focusing 
on core rather than headline inflation. Furthermore, while giving more weight to output 
stabilization may not help in case of stochastic shocks, given the lags involved, it clearly 
helps in case of persistent demand stagnation.  
Figure 39. Focusing on core or headline inflation
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Assuming persistent negative shocks that depress output growth by two percentage points 
below the three-percent trend rate, Figure 39 compares the output effects of focusing on 
headline versus core inflation. More precisely, it describes the ‘worst case’ where both 
wage settlements and monetary policy focus on headline inflation: as the slump prompts 
tax-push inflation monetary policymakers hike interest rates, which depresses output 
growth further. The resulting budgetary pressures nourish further tax-push, and “second-
round effects” from labor markets help keeping the flame alive too. To the extent that 
monetary policy focus shifts toward core inflation and second-round effects fail to arise, 
  82interest rate cuts help to boost growth and stabilize the economy. This is even more the 
case if monetary policy pays direct attention to output growth as well.   
Figure 40. Tax-push inflation and perverse interest rate responses
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Figure 40 shows what is at stake here. Clearly, a focus on headline inflation is leading 
policy astray: the rise in inflation caused by the interaction of monetary and fiscal 
policies seems to justify interest rate hikes – but really calls for interest rate cuts, as these 
would forestall the problem. Of course it is not necessary for actual interest rate hikes to 
occur. A failure to ease policy in a timely and well-measured way so as to stabilize output 
growth is sufficient to cause the problem. Notice though that even in the case of a focus 
on core inflation, Figure x is featuring an initial “perverse” interest rate hike before 
policy turns in the right direction. This is because the “core” simulation assumes a 
residual element of headline-inflation orientation in wage determination (the value of b4 
is 0.8, not 1). And a few words of caution may be in order here regarding the role of wage 
rigidities – the supposed culprit of all troubles in the view of many observers.  
The point is that coefficient b4 captures the notorious issue of “second-round effects” of 
wage reactions to rising headline inflation (driven by hikes in indirect taxes in particular). 
While the “worst case” was described above as a situation of strict headline inflation 
orientation by both the monetary authorities and wage settlements. It does not follow that 
a strict core-inflation focus by all parties necessarily describes the best of all worlds. If 
wage settlements fully ignore headline inflation this may actually be risky, especially 
  83when inflation is very low already. For this implies that wages are correspondingly more 
responsive to the depressed real situation – equivalent also to higher values of b3.  
Figure 41. Labor market flexibility and liquidity traps
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The risk – illustrated in Figure 41 – is that this can easily lead the economy into a 
deflationary spiral. As the wage anchor of prices is cut off, the economy may quickly 
sink into a liquidity trap situation – should the central bank fail to stem the tight early and 
aggressively enough. Put differently, the absence of second-round effects makes 
monetary easing even more urgent a matter in case of a sharp slump.  
Presumably it is this very kind of increased responsiveness to the real situation (apart 
from simply squeezing wages) which the structural reform agenda aims at. Just that the 
reformers may not know what they are wishing for, particularly under current 
circumstances of extremely low underlying inflation and in view of the ECB’s peculiar 
admission that it has already maneuvered the euro area into a liquidity trap. The supposed 
best case of flexible nominal wages and absence of second round effects requires even 
more proactive monetary easing to insure against worst-case outcomes. Yet, the risk-
management approach does not enjoy universal popularity among central bankers – 
especially those who are used to operate with the safety net of nominal wage rigidities.  
Suffice to mention that I readily admit that it is the Keynesian structure of the model set-
up which produces these results. Perhaps the time has come when stability-oriented 
apostles might wish to take a pause and reflect upon Milton Friedman’s (2002) advice 
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enough for central bankers to fantasize forever about some “long run” in which monetary 
policy might perhaps be neutral since real world interest rate policies are always and 
inevitably carried out in the short run. Friedman even quoted Keynes’s famous dictum on 
that occasion. How right he was. For if current institutions and practices persist the euro 
may be dead before all too long.  
10. Summary and policy recommendations  
The analysis of recent price developments in Germany and the euro area should alert us 
to the risks involved with the fashionable one-sided focus on structural factors only. In 
fact, the popular view that structural rigidities in goods and labor markets are to blame for 
the persistence in inflation observed since 2000 altogether misses the point. For while it 
is true that headline inflation has proved surprisingly sticky in recent years, the same 
does not hold for measures of core inflation which better capture the true underlying 
demand situation and also provide a more accurate picture of the responsiveness of prices 
to market forces.  
Such a measure of market-determined underlying inflation was developed in this paper. 
In addition to the OECD’s standard practice of excluding food, energy, alcohol and 
tobacco the proposed measure also excludes distortions in headline inflation that reflect 
governmental measures rather than market forces (or, tax-push inflation). This more 
appropriate inflation measure
44 shows not only that the persistence in inflation in recent 
years has been largely apparent rather than real, but also that market-determined 
underlying inflation has meanwhile reached extraordinarily low levels. For the euro area 
as a whole underlying market forces currently sustain a rate of inflation of merely one 
percent, while in Germany, for instance, this rate is actually zero.  
Many economists view such low levels of inflation as a curse rather than a blessing. 
Since nominal interest rates, having trailed the decline in inflation and protracted 
stagnation, are already at “historically extremely low” levels, as the ECB does not tire to 
emphasize, this limits the scope that may be left for deliberate policies of pushing real 
                                                 
44 This ignores the issue of a likely statistical bias in measured inflation, which is believed to be in the order 
of 0.5 percent for the euro area.  
  85interest rates lower in an emergency. At the same time, real interest rates are not nearly as 
low as they might seem to be when nominal rates are deflated at headline inflation. 
Headline inflation has primarily been pushed up by two factors: energy prices and tax-
push inflation. Both factors crush the purchasing power of the euro area’s private sector. 
They should be excluded when assessing the level of real interest rates as felt by the 
private sector. In view of protracted domestic demand stagnation, depressed income 
growth expectations and job insecurity real interest rates in large parts of the euro area 
seem rather high.  
But the real risk here is that underlying inflation is so low now that it could quickly enter 
deflationary territory. This is especially the case if structural reforms further demolished 
downward wage rigidities while at the same time weakening confidence and demand. So 
the most urgent and immediate concern is to sharpen the awareness of the very high risk 
that Germany and the euro area could then easily slip into deflation.  
Other recommendations concern the question how Germany and the euro area managed 
to end up in the current unenviable situation. One issue is that no accurate measure of 
tax-push inflation currently exists for the euro area. The analysis here thus had to rely on 
the ECB proxy measure and whatever measures and studies may be available at the 
national level. Currently, Eurostat is piloting a project to develop an area-wide “Constant 
Tax” consumer price index, which should yield first results by next year. This initiative is 
surely to be welcomed although it only looks after one part of the issue, indirect taxes, 
whereas the role of administered prices remains excluded.  
Another issue is that the ECB was wrong from the beginning in narrow-mindedly 
focusing its “stability-oriented” policies on headline inflation (in some “medium term”). 
Hence, even if proper measures of tax-push were available, it is not clear what difference 
this would make to monetary policy. Both theoretical investigations into the matter as 
well as the simulation exercises undertaken here suggest that monetary policy might end 
up chasing its own tail when it allows itself to be misled by distorted headline inflation. 
Given that the ECB itself has made efforts to estimate the magnitude of tax push it can 
hardly claim to be wholly unaware of the matter. But the ECB and other observers 
obviously fail to comprehend that the phenomenon originates from the fateful interaction 
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for fiscal consolidation no matter what while granting that headline inflation above two 
percent provides an excuse for the ECB to renege on its growth mandate.  
And this leads up to the most fundamental recommendation concerning the pitiful 
performance of the euro area since 2000. It is high time for the responsible authorities to 
acknowledge that the macroeconomic policy framework of EMU is seriously 
malfunctioning. Importantly, it is not simply that reckless spendthrift finance ministers 
fail to abide by the Maastricht rules, thereby giving rise to inflation risks that prevent the 
ECB from conducting stability-oriented monetary policies of a more growth-friendly 
kind. Rather, the point is that while it was clear from the start that monetary policy would 
be the only available instrument to counter symmetric demand shocks hitting the euro 
area, the ECB has persistently reneged on this vital responsibility; its notorious, though 
ill-founded, excuse being inflation persistence and structural problems.  
Paradoxically, the ECB’s negligence as regards growth and obsession with price stability 
is the root cause of inflation persistence in the stagnating euro area economy. By 
carelessly provoking a slump and productivity slowdown it first caused the rise in core 
inflation in 2001. By failing to equally aggressively stimulate a recovery the ECB then 
provoked the budgetary squeeze that triggered tax-push inflation in subsequent years. 
Tax-push inflation has contributed up to a third of overall euro area inflation in 2004. In 
Germany’s case, its weight may at times have been even around 50 percent. While 
significant diversity was found across the euro area, the overall empirical evidence 
strongly supports the hypothesis that tax-push inflation has been a key driver in price 
developments in recent years and that it was itself mainly driven by budgetary pressures 
that arose in the context of protracted stagnation. It seems quite absurd, then, to blame the 
resulting persistence in inflation on structural rigidities which apparently justified a 
“cautious” monetary policy stance, when monetary policy itself is causing the whole 
trouble in the first place.  
Even today, there may still be observers around who praise the apparent lack of 
deliberate demand management as a key advantage of the Maastricht regime. And indeed, 
more than mere semantics were involved when the traditional term stabilization policies 
  87was replaced by the German notion of “stability-oriented” policies. Yet, the idea of doing 
without demand management reflects serious confusion. As in any other modern 
economy, the euro area too has both fiscal and monetary policies. By their very nature, 
these policies inevitably and inherently are demand management. There is thus no 
absence of demand management – pure fiction anyway. It is the presence of highly 
dysfunctional macroeconomic policies which is the problem.  
The analysis here has revealed that tax-push inflation, a peculiar type of stagflation and 
key driver behind the apparent persistence in inflation in the euro area over recent years, 
is a symptom of the counterproductive interaction of fiscal and monetary policies under 
the Maastricht regime. This regime requires a fundamental overhaul – with the primary 
objective of refocusing macroeconomic policies on stabilization and GDP growth. 
Structural reforms can only complement more successful macroeconomic management, 
but cannot substitute for them. In fact, continued one-sided focus on structural reform 
without macroeconomic policy reform will further magnify already existing risks of 
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